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DOCTRINAL CONFLICT IN FOREIGN INVESTMENT
REGULATION IN INDIA: NTT DOCOMO VS. TATA SONS
AND THE CASE FOR “DOWNSIDE PROTECTION”

M.P. RAM MOHAN,* NOBUHISA ISHIZUKA** & SIDHARTH SHARMA***

ABSTRACT
The strategic importance of India as an investment destination
for foreign investors is highlighted by ongoing tensions in the IndoPacific region and the recognition that a strong economic
relationship with India is in the interests of countries seeking a more
stable balance of power in the region. From a policy perspective,
India has struggled to balance its own economic interests with the
commercial requirements of investors. Rules attempting to strike
this balance have created uncertainties that have resulted in
investors seeking greater protections for their investments, which in
turn have triggered additional regulatory responses that enforce
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Legal Studies and a Lecturer in Law at Columbia Law School. Prior to Columbia
Law School, he was a Partner at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP.
*** Sidharth Sharma is a lawyer practicing in New Delhi and is also an
advocate-on-record at the Supreme Court of India.
We are grateful to Vishakha Raj for excellent research assistance. Many thanks to
Duncan Hall, Danuta Egle, Katelyn Hughes, and the entire University of
Pennsylvania Journal of International Law team for editorial support. Nobuhisa
Ishizuka and Sidharth Sharma were members of the NTT Docomo and Tata Sons
legal teams, respectively, in the dispute cited as the principal case study in this
Article. However, this Article does not represent the views of the entities they acted
for. The Article is based on publicly available information, reflects the authors’
personal opinions, and is an academic endeavour to generate debate and discussion
on a complex legal and regulatory issue.
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India’s policy preferences. The prevalent use of put options by
foreign investors, whereby Indian parties are required to buy out
their counterparties at predetermined prices, has been a prominent
subject of these regulations. India’s judiciary has been drawn into
this cycle through actions brought by foreign investors seeking to
enforce arbitration awards validating their exit rights. In the
process, they have created their own interpretation of the
applicability of foreign investment rules that support principles of
freedom of contract. This doctrinal conflict with regulatory policy
is illustrated by a high-profile dispute involving one of Japan’s
largest and most well-known companies, NTT Docomo, and one of
India’s largest and most trusted companies, Tata Sons. Japan views
India as a key strategic partner and, in particular, views strong
economic ties as a central linchpin of the partnership. Using,
principally, the Tata-Docomo case as an example, and a review of
other similar disputes, this Article analyzes the regulatory and
judicial doctrines that have shaped foreign investment regulation in
India and explores the public policy implications of the conflict for
India. In doing so, it proposes regulatory reforms to provide more
clarity and certainty for investors, suggesting that express
recognition of “downside protection” for investments provides a
rational balance between private commercial interests and public
regulatory objectives.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol43/iss3/3
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INTRODUCTION

A key objective of the Government of India’s foreign direct
investment (FDI) policy is to make it transparent, predictable, and
easily comprehensible.1 These features are crucial to increase and
maintain investor confidence in the Indian market. As of 2019, India
attracted net FDI inflows of about fifty billion dollars. 2 Three
countries— Mauritius, Singapore, and the United States of
America—account for over fifty percent of India’s FDI inflows. 3
Despite the pandemic, India’s FDI inflows from the United States
have increased in the period between April 2020 and September
2020 when compared to the period between April 2019 and March
2020.4 Japan’s percentage of total investment inflows to India over
the same period is on par with that of the United States at seven
percent, making it the fifth largest investor by FDI equity inflows.5
Though the FDI policy clearly articulates the need to maintain a
stable investment environment, there are portions of India’s
regulatory framework that create uncertainty for foreign investors.
This Article examines one such area of India’s regulatory landscape,
namely, the treatment of foreign investors’ exit rights under foreign
exchange regulation.

1
See Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (FDI
Division), Ministry of Commerce and Industry of India, Consolidated FDI Policy
Circular of 2020, at 5 (Effective from October 15, 2020) [hereinafter Consolidated
FDI Policy], https://dpiit.gov.in/sites/default/files/FDI-PolicyCircular-202029October2020_0.pdf. The Consolidated FDI Policy is issued by the Government of
India through its Department for the Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade.
The Consolidated FDI Policy is a comprehensive document containing the
conditions for eligible investors, sector-wise caps on foreign investment (where
applicable) and the procedure for seeking government approvals where required.
2
See THE WORLD BANK, Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$),
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD
[https://perma.cc/569N-Y5NF].
3
See MINISTRY OF COM. & INDUS., INDIA, QUARTERLY FACT SHEET ON FOREIGN
DIRECT
INVESTMENT
2
(2020),
https://dipp.gov.in/sites/default/files/FDI_Fact_sheet_September_20.pdf.
4
See id.
5
See id. According to data from the Ministry of Finance, Japan, investment
outflows from Japan into India in 2019 amounted to about 452 billion Yen. See also
MINISTRY OF FINANCE, JAPAN, DIRECT INVESTMENT FLOWS 2019 C.Y. (2019),
https://www.mof.go.jp/english/international_policy/reference/balance_of_pay
ments/ebpfdii.htm [https://perma.cc/W7SX-SQ2M].
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A corporation investing abroad is subject to increased downside
risk (the risk of incurring losses) compared to one that only invests
domestically. 6 The geographical distance of the investment and
differences in language and culture between the country of the
foreign investor and the country of investment reduces an investor’s
ability to effectively monitor their investment operations.7 This type
of information asymmetry is a risk that is unique to foreign
investment.8 The management of a company also exercises lesser
control over its foreign investments than its domestic ones.9 This
can either be a result of the same informational asymmetry that
affects shareholders or due to a government’s FDI policy. In India,
the FDI policy requires investors to partner with domestic firms if
they want to make investments in certain sectors within India. 10
This is done by capping the level of foreign investment that an
enterprise in India is allowed to accept.11 Even if the investment is
not capped, some sectors such as air transport services and telecom
services require government approval for foreign investment
exceeding specified thresholds, for example, forty-nine percent. 12
6
See Li-Hsun Wang, Chu-Hsiung Lin, Hung-Gay Fung & Tzu-Chuan Kao,
Foreign Direct Investment and Downside Risk: Evidence from Taiwan, 57 PAC.-BASIN FIN.
J. 1, 2, 13 (2019) (concluding that FDI may increase agency problems and
information asymmetry, which lead to downside risks).
7
See id. at 2, 4.
8 See Wang et al., supra note 6 (demonstrating that FDI implies a higher degree
of information asymmetry); Itay Goldstein & Assaf Razin, An Information-Based
Trade Off Between Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment, 70 J. INT’L
ECON. 271, 272, 268-88 (2006) (concluding that FDI allows for more information
regarding the control and management of the corporation when compared to
foreign portfolio investment; however, when it comes to the sale of the business,
the information asymmetry leads to a less lucrative sale in cases of FDI than when
the investment is through foreign portfolio investment).
9
See Wang et al., supra note 6, at 4 (arguing that factors such as geographical
constraints and cultural, legal, and linguistic differences create agency problems,
which would not exist in the case of domestic investments).
10
See Consolidated FDI Policy, supra note 1, at 20, 34.
11 See Consolidated FDI Policy, supra note 1, at 20, 30-66. The cap is the
maximum percentage of FDI investment in an undertaking in a sector as prescribed
by the FDI Policy. In addition to the cap on the percentage of investment in equity
that a foreign investor may make, the policy provides for two FDI routes—the
automatic route and the government approval route. The existence of a cap on
foreign investment does not have a bearing on the investment route. Some sectors
such as publication of journals and magazines allow for 100 percent FDI, but this
FDI requires government approval. Other sectors such as petroleum refining by
public sector undertakings cap foreign investment in equity (forty-nine percent in
this case) but do not require government approval for the investment.
12 See Consolidated FDI Policy, supra note 1, at 39, 46.
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The lower level of direct control exercised by a foreign investor leads
to measures to curb the extent of risk the foreign investor is exposed
o; these measures are referred to as “downside risk protection.”13
An important downside risk protection measure is the put
option, which has become virtually ubiquitous in foreign
investment agreements in India. 14 At a basic level, put options
provide a foreign investor with an exit mechanism by granting the
foreign investor the right to sell its investment position (often held
in the form of shares in the venture) to its partner in India. An exit
mechanism, by way of a put option, may even be a necessity in those
companies whose stocks are not publicly traded or where the
foreign investor’s holding is illiquid and the demand for it is limited.
However, put options are also used by foreign investors for
protection against losses by imposing an obligation on the Indian
partner to purchase shares at a predetermined price or a minimum
guaranteed price. The purpose of such pricing is to control the
investor’s exposure to potential losses from the investment, either
by ensuring principal protection (with or without an interest
component), assured returns, or limitation of downside risk. The
Indian foreign exchange regime (administered by the Indian central
bank—the Reserve Bank of India—and the federal government in
consultation with each other), however, makes it difficult to enforce
such put options as it requires securities held by foreign residents to
be sold to Indian residents at a price not exceeding the fair market
value prevailing at the time of exercise. 15 Although the foreign
exchange laws have ostensibly permitted put options, the pricing
requirements for the sale of securities, which until the year 2019
used to be regulated by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and are now

13
See generally Kashish Makkar & Sarthak Jain, Enforcement of Exit Options in
Foreign Investment Agreements: A Call for Reform in Indian Law, 30 INT’L CO. & COM.
L. REV. 399 (2019). For a discussion of a recent Delhi High Court decision that may
increase foreign investment in India by providing foreign investors with
downward protection of their equity investment, see Anurag Pareek, Tata—Docomo
Verdict:
A
Critical
Analysis,
INDIACORPLAW
(May
30,
2017),
https://indiacorplaw.in/2017/05/tata-docomo-verdict-critical-analysis.html
[https://perma.cc/K3TK-988L].
14
See Makkar & Jain, supra note 13, at 399 (“Call and put options are
ubiquitous in present-day investment agreements, especially those involving joint
ventures, private equity or venture capital investments.”); see also Umakanth
Varottil, Investment Agreements in India: Is There an “Option”?, 4 NUJS L. REV. 467,
468 (2011).
15
See infra text accompanying footnotes 146, 150.
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regulated by India’s federal government, 16 operate as an
impediment to the exercise of most put options.17 The result is that
even when Indian buyers are willing to pay the agreed
predetermined price for the securities, foreign exchange regulations
pose significant difficulties.18
The extensive use of put options by foreign investors in India,
and their acceptance by Indian partners, is indicative of their relative
bargaining power and perception of the risks of investing in the
Indian market. For instance, in the United States, a commercially
advanced market characterized by a relatively developed and
business-friendly regulatory regime, resort to such mechanisms is
generally limited to situations dictated by the perceived risks of the
specific investment, the creditworthiness of the counterparty, and
the negotiating leverage of the investor. In the Indian context,
uncertainties created by the regulatory environment may be another
factor that drives investor desire for the protection of put options
apart from the sector-specific business risks and the overall
economic conditions at the time of the transaction.19 Although the
main objective of such options is to protect against losses, India’s
regulatory landscape has made them difficult to enforce. 20 Given
that foreign exchange rules do not permit the transfer of securities
from a non-resident to a resident at a price exceeding market value,21
put options can only be legitimately exercised when the
predetermined sale price is lower than or equal to the prevailing

16
Pursuant to an amendment to foreign exchange laws notified in 2019, the
power to regulate capital account transactions such as transfer of securities, other
than debt instruments, vests in the federal government, i.e., the Central
Government of India. This change was primarily brought about to align the
legislative source of FDI regime. Earlier, there was a regulatory overlap. While the
federal government (the Central Government) was in charge of framing the FDI
policy, the implementing rules and regulations came from the RBI. This caused
confusion at times. This gap was sought to be addressed by amendments to the
foreign exchange laws proposed in 2015, which were finally notified in October
2019. See infra text accompanying footnote 137.
17
See infra text accompanying notes 146, 150.
18
See infra text accompanying notes 146, 150.
19
For example, in the case of Tata-Docomo investment transaction, which
took place in the second half of 2008, the then prevailing global financial crisis may
have been one of many factors influencing parties’ agreement on the put option.
20
See Ministry of Finance, Foreign Exchange Management (Non-debt
Instruments) Rules, S.O. 3732(E) (Notified on October 17, 2019) (India).
21
See id. rule 9(5) and rule 21(2)(c)(iii).
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market price at the time of exercise22—which, of course, defeats the
purpose of the option.
In order to address this issue, parties to foreign investment
agreements attempt to structure their transactions around these
regulations. Foreign investors who are accustomed to relying on
contractual protections (and legal opinions on their enforceability)
have few legal constraints on the exercise of their rights. However,
domestic Indian parties who are directly subject to regulatory
sanctions for violations of foreign investment rules are often
reluctant to perform their contractual obligations in the absence of
express approval from the regulators, which is generally not granted
as a matter of practice. A number of these transactions therefore
have ended up in arbitration proceedings to resolve disputes over
the domestic party’s legal ability to perform.23 On account of such
cases brought before Indian courts by foreign investors to enforce
arbitral awards compelling the performance of put options, the
Indian judiciary has been forced to address the conflict between the
contractual rights of foreign investors and the regulatory regime.
The Indian judiciary has consistently upheld a foreign investor’s
right to sustain monetary claims under put options notwithstanding
the regulatory restrictions. However, they have done so not by
ruling directly on the permissibility or enforceability of put options
within the foreign exchange regulatory framework per se, but
within the circumscribed role assigned to them under Indian
arbitration law, which follows a narrow approach to overturning
arbitral awards under the New York Convention. The Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 24 adopts a pro-enforcement approach
and requires that the judiciary decide on the enforceability of a
foreign arbitral award without reviewing its merits. Significantly,
Indian courts have gone further by holding that violations of foreign
exchange rules cannot be grounds to refuse the enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards.25 Moreover, courts have held that Indian
regulators also are bound by arbitral findings. 26 In doing so, the
stance of the judiciary, though consistent with international
See id.
See e.g., NTT Docomo, Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd., (2017) SCC Online Del 8078
(India); Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings v. Unitech Ltd., (2017) SCC Online Del 7810
(India); Banyan Tree Growth Cap. v. Axiom Cordages Ltd., (2020) SCC Online Bom
781 (India).
24
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 [hereinafter Arbitration Act].
25
See infra Part V(A).
26
See infra Part V(B).
22

23
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commercial arbitration jurisprudence, appears at odds with the
domestic regulatory framework governing put options. This
doctrinal conflict in foreign investment regulation raises significant
public policy implications for India and the resulting uncertainties
call for more clarity and predictability. This is compounded by the
fact that (i) attempts to structure around restrictions will continue to
be subject to the need for testing through costly arbitration and
litigation, (ii) the confidential and non-stare decisis nature of arbitral
proceedings impedes their use as precedent, and (iii)
notwithstanding arbitral and judicial findings that recognize the
validity of a foreign investor’s rights, actual transmission of
payments by Indian parties to non-residents continue to remain
subject to potential regulatory hurdles.
This Article examines case law to explain how the current regime
has come to be and suggests regulatory reforms to provide much
needed clarity for foreign investors. NTT Docomo, Inc. v. Tata Sons
Ltd.27 (the Docomo case) is an example of the regulatory uncertainties
surrounding put option agreements and how the resolution
ultimately came through a contested judicial process which could
have been avoided if there was better regulatory clarity. Part II uses
the Docomo case to explain how the regulatory regime has interfered
with the use of a certain form of risk protection—downside
protection—by foreign investors and gives an overview of the
international commercial arbitration regime in India. Parts III and
IV examine the evolution of the public policy exception in detail and
explain why any optimism about the prevailing pro-enforcement
trend in the judiciary should be held with caution. Part V takes a
closer look at the Docomo case and compares it to other High Court
decisions that have dealt with the enforcement of put options
through arbitral awards. Thereafter, Part VI explains the problem
with relying on the judiciary and arbitration proceedings to enforce
investors’ exit option rights. This Article emphasizes the imperative
to distinguish put options structured to extend downside protection
to foreign investors from put options structured to assure financial
returns to such investors. It finds that while courts will enforce
foreign arbitral awards to allow investors to exercise a put option,
the conflict between judicial and regulatory doctrine and the process
of obtaining and enforcing awards come with their own quantitative
and qualitative costs.
Importantly, this is an unnecessary
encumbrance on the enforcement of contractual rights and
27

NTT Docomo, Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd., (2017) SCC Online Del 8078 (India).
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significantly increases the cost of foreign investment—for both the
foreign investor as well as the Indian party.
II.

THE TATA-DOCOMO CASE AND THE ROCKY ROAD TO
ENFORCING PUT OPTIONS IN INDIA

The case of NTT Docomo, Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd.28 is an important
example of how foreign exchange laws affect a party’s ability to
ensure the benefits of freely negotiated contractual investment
protections. Docomo had invested approximately USD 2.5 billion to
acquire twenty-six percent of the shares in Tata Teleservices Limited
(TTSL). As a safety net for Docomo’s investment, a clause in the
Shareholders Agreement allowed Docomo to exit with at least half
of the value (a predetermined price) it had invested in TTSL. When
Docomo exercised its right to exit, Tata claimed it was not possible
for it to purchase Docomo’s shares at the predetermined price
(which exceeded the fair value of the shares prevailing at the time)
without regulatory approval from the RBI. Tata asserted that it had
made efforts to obtain the approval, which was denied. The
regulators were unwilling to grant approval to Tata for the purchase
of Docomo’s shares based on the predetermined terms of exit. This
led to a dispute between Tata and Docomo which resulted in
arbitration before the London Court of International Arbitration
(LCIA). The LCIA gave its award in favour of Docomo and required
Tata to pay Docomo damages equivalent to Docomo’s stipulated
downside protection. This award was enforced in India through a
decision of the Delhi High Court.
The Docomo case represents a peculiar situation in which an
award of damages for non-performance (as opposed to specific
performance) provided the only remedy for a foreign investor
seeking to have its contract enforced. For the Indian party too, the
situation was peculiar, as it had to face a finding of contractual
28
Id. Tata Sons Ltd. (“Tata”), the respondent, is a company incorporated in
India and about sixty-six percent of its equity shareholding is held by Tata
Philanthropic Trusts. Tata is the principal investment holding company of the
business conglomerate commonly known as the ‘Tata group’, which operates in
more than 100 countries across six continents. NTT Docomo (“Docomo”), the
petitioner, is a company incorporated in Japan and is the biggest mobile
telecommunications service provider in the country. It also provides services in
other countries in Asia, Europe, and the United States. At the time of the case,
Docomo was listed on the Tokyo and New York stock exchanges.
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breach even while it maintained that it remained ready and willing
to pay the predetermined contractual price, provided the regulator
granted its approval. Because the regulatory permission was
denied, Tata asserted that the only legal way to perform the contract
was pursuant to the pricing rules mandated by the foreign exchange
regulations, which would result in a payment significantly below
the agreed amount. Docomo asserted, however, that the contract
could be performed in full in accordance with its terms without
violation of the rules. As a result, arbitration became the only way
to resolve the dispute with regard to performance of the contract. In
this case, the foreign arbitral award effectively provided the means
by which the parties were able to exercise contractual rights which
they were prevented from exercising because of regulatory hurdles.
Docomo was not the first case to face this situation. India’s restrictive
put option enforcement regime has virtually made arbitration a prerequisite to their enforcement.29
The circumstances described above exemplify why the Indian
government and the RBI need to rationalise their policy on put
options exercisable by foreign investors.30 Put options give parties
the right (but not the obligation) to sell their shares in a company at
a pre-agreed sale price, and impose an obligation on the
counterparty to purchase the shares at such price.31 As discussed
above, because foreign investors use put options to secure their exit
from a venture, the stable and predictable enforcement of put
options is an important means to attract and retain investments.32
The Indian government and particularly the RBI, being India’s
monetary policy regulator, are legitimately concerned by put
options because they are capable of requiring Indian residents to pay
large sums of money as consideration to purchase the securities of
foreign investors using foreign currency.33 From a monetary policy
perspective, this is capable of straining India’s foreign exchange
reserves.34 Another objective of the regulation of put options is to
address a policy issue at a conceptual level—balancing the
See infra Part II.
Makkar & Jain, supra note 13, at 400.
31
Makkar & Jain, supra note 13, at 401.
32
Makkar & Jain, supra note 13, at 401-02.
33
Makkar & Jain, supra note 13, at 410, 414.
34
Makkar & Jain, supra note 13, at 414. Technically, payment is made in
Rupees and are converted to dollars under hedging arrangements that are entered
into by the relevant party. India’s foreign exchange reserves are affected when the
Rupees that the counterparty sells into the market flow back to India for dollars.
29
30
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objectives of FDI policy with the purpose of put options. The FDI
regime is aimed at attracting, facilitating, and incentivizing longterm equity investments in which the foreign investor has a stake in
the country’s economy and gets to share both the reward and risk.
An option to exit at a pre-agreed price takes away from these longterm objectives of the FDI policy. It would also, if allowed in an
unfettered manner, incentivise parties to structure transactions
(which appear to be equity investments in nature) in a manner that
attain the characteristics of debt (which are separately regulated
under external borrowing rules).35 However, put options also play
a role in attracting investments by allowing foreign investors (even
long-term strategic investors) to cap their losses. This is the
regulatory conundrum that needs to be addressed and requires a
balancing act on the part of the Indian government and the RBI.
a. Assured Return vs. Downside Protection
Put options can either allow investors to exit at a price which
provides them assured returns or simply provide downside
protection.36 When an investor secures assured returns through a
put option, it will allow the investor a route to exit while recovering
all of its invested capital in addition to returns on the investment.37
This effectively removes the risk associated with the investment and
converts equity risk into an instrument with debt-like
characteristics. 38 The association of put options with debt
instruments occurs because when exercised, put options require
shareholders or the company to purchase the investor’s shares at the
predetermined sale price, which includes a return component. An
investor’s ability to exit at a predetermined price that is higher than
or equal to the original investment takes away the essential risk35
See Reserve Bank of India, Foreign Exchange Management (Borrowing and
Lending) Regulations, Notification No. FEMA.3(R)/2018-RB (Notified on
December 17, 2018) [hereinafter External Borrowing Rules].
36
Makkar & Jain, supra note 13, at 410-11.
37
Makkar & Jain, supra note 13, at 410-11. Investors can also negotiate for a
return of original principal invested, or for a sale at current appraised market value.
As a commercial matter, most investors (particularly financial investors) would
seek to be compensated for the use of their money through an interest component.
A current fair market value approach is the one preferred by the regulators, which
for the reasons stated above defeats the protective purpose of exit options. For
these reasons, this Article focuses on the assured return and downside risk options.
38 Makkar & Jain, supra note 13, at 409-10.
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bearing equity characteristic of a shareholder.39 This raises concerns
because the incurrence of external debt is separately regulated by
external commercial borrowing (ECB) rules which are intended to
control capital outflows under the same policy considerations
governing maintenance of foreign exchange reserves.40
In contrast, put options designed for downside risk protection
do not guarantee investors an assured return on their investment.41
Rather, they limit the losses that an investor incurs. Typically, such
options are structured (as in the Docomo case) to calculate the sale
price as the higher of the prevailing fair market price and a set
percentage of the original investment amount. The sale price in put
options providing downside protection will not necessarily enable
the investor to recover the entire amount it has invested when the
put option is exercised by it. In fact, such put options merely
establish a floor price for their exercise; fair market value will always
be used as a baseline because the selling party will want to preserve
that possibility up to the point it merges with the floor amount.
From a regulatory perspective, concerns about foreign exchange
outflows are mitigated to the extent of the portion of the original
investment amount that remains in the country.
Unfortunately, the current blanket regulation of all put options
does not appear to contemplate allowing put options even for
downside protection. Both types of these put options were
effectively made impermissible by a circular issued by the RBI in
January 2014, 42 and that position continues to date in the extant
rules. 43 As a result, exercise of either type of option by foreign
investors leads to Indian parties seeking assurance from regulators
that their performance of obligations under investment contracts
will not violate local rules, and further lead to assertions by the
Indian party that performance in the absence of such assurances is

39
Makkar & Jain, supra note 13, at 412; Davide Contini & Guido Motti, Option
agreements in private equity transactions in Italy, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE (Oct. 2016),
https://www.financierworldwide.com/option-agreements-in-private-equitytransactions-in-italy#.YrItCXbMJPY [https://perma.cc/U553-XD4S].
40
External Borrowing Rules, supra note 35.
41
NTT Docomo, Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd., (2017) SCC Online Del 8078, ¶ 45
(India); Makkar & Jain, supra note 13, at 411-12.
42
Makkar & Jain, supra note 13, at 413; Reserve Bank of India, Pricing
Guidelines for FDI Instruments with optionality clauses, RBI/2013-2014/436
(Issued on January 9, 2014).
43
See infra notes 135, 155, and accompanying text.
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prohibited.44 Deadlocks among parties and regulators created by
such exercises of exit rights inevitably lead to disputes requiring
resort to India’s international commercial arbitration regime, which
is contained in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.45
The Arbitration Act of India follows the scheme of the New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 1958.46 The grounds on which the enforcement of a foreign
arbitral award can be refused under the Arbitration Act are the same
as those under Article V of the New York Convention. 47 These
grounds cover the capacity of the tribunal, arbitrability of the
dispute brought to the tribunal, and procedural aspects such as the
right to notice and the right to present one’s case.48 In addition to
the aforementioned grounds, the courts in the country where the
enforcement of a foreign award is sought can reject its enforcement
if such enforcement would be contrary to the public policy of that
country.49 Indian courts have long grappled with the scope of the
public policy exception to enforcing foreign arbitral awards. While
the current arbitration law adopts a “pro-enforcement” approach,50

44
Shahezad Kazi & Aditi Agarwal, India: Enforcement Of Foreign Awards
Granting A Put Option Despite Objections Under The FEMA, MONDAQ (July 22, 2020),
https://www.mondaq.com/india/securities/968018/enforcement-of-foreignawards-granting-a-put-option-despite-objections-under-the-fema
[https://perma.cc/WNP6-B2MW]; Nandan Nelivigi, Dipen Sabharwal QC &
Aditya Singh, In a landmark ruling, Indian court rejects objections to enforcement of a
$300
million
LCIA
award,
WHITE
&
CASE
(June
7,
2017),
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/landmark-ruling-indian-courtrejects-objections-enforcement-300-million-lcia [https://perma.cc/WY6Z-EJFU].
45
Arbitration Act, supra note 24.
46
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, Oct. 6, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S 3 [hereinafter New York Convention].
47
See Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi, (2020) SCC Online SC 177, ¶ 54
(India) (in referring to Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings v. Unitech Ltd., (2017) SCC
Online Del 7810 (India), “ . . . Section 48 of the Act is a statutory expression of Article
V of the New York Convention and is similarly worded.”); L AW COMM’N OF INDIA,
AMENDMENTS TO THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996, REPORT NO. 246, at
4 (2014) [hereinafter LAW COMMISSION REPORT].
48
Arbitration Act, supra note 24, § 48(1), at 24.
49
Arbitration Act, supra note 24, § 48(2), at 24.
50
Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi, (2020) SCC Online SC 177, ¶ 47
(India); Debarshi Dutta & Rajat Pradhan, India: Delhi High Court Reaffirms “ProEnforcement” Approach—Enforcement Of Foreign Awards Is Slowly Becoming The Rule,
MONDAQ (July 10, 2020), https://www.mondaq.com/india/arbitration-disputeresolution/963570/delhi-high-court-reaffirms-pro-enforcement-approachenforcement-of-foreign-awards-is-slowly-becoming-the-rule
[https://perma.cc/LJE3-MGYR].
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a 2020 Supreme Court decision has brought back uncertainty
regarding the public policy exception’s scope.51
Foreign arbitral awards based on put option clauses have been
consistently challenged on the grounds that their enforcement
would violate India’s foreign exchange law, and consequently,
India’s public policy. So far, High Courts and the Supreme Court of
India have rejected this reasoning.52 The courts’ stance has been that
the public policy exception ought to be applied narrowly and that
this approach would have to be followed even when it comes to
foreign awards which effectively enforce put options. It has also
been held that a contravention of India’s foreign exchange laws
alone will not warrant the application of the public policy
exception. 53 The courts’ consistent approach to enforcing foreign
awards is an important reassurance for foreign investors. However,
this pro-enforcement approach has its limitations; a general
commitment to creating a foreign investor-friendly policy and
regulatory reform from the Indian government and the RBI are also
required to create a stable and predictable investment environment
in India. This would also significantly reduce the costs of enforcing
contractual exit rights held by foreign investors by reducing
disputes and the need to resort to arbitration.
III. THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION UNDER INDIAN COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION LAW
International arbitration law in India has been consolidated by
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 54 The Arbitration Act
divides arbitration proceedings into foreign seated arbitration and
India seated arbitration.55 Any reference to a foreign arbitral award
is thus a reference to an award of a foreign seated arbitration. This
51 National Agricultural Cooperative Market Federation in India v. Alimenta,
(2020) SCC Online SC 381 (India).
52
See Banyan Tree Growth Cap. v. Axiom Cordages Ltd., (2020) SCC Online
Bom 781 (India); Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi, (2020) SCC Online SC 177
(India); NTT Docomo, Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd., (2017) SCC Online Del 8078 (India);
Shakti Nath v. Alpha Tiger Cyprus Inv., (2017) SCC Online Del 6894 (India); Cruz
City 1 Mauritius Holdings v. Unitech Ltd., (2017) SCC Online Del 7810 (India).
53
See Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi, (2020) SCC Online SC 177, ¶ 97
(India).
54
See Arbitration Act, supra note 24, Preamble.
55
Pierre Tercier & Dilber Devitre, The Public Policy Exception—A Comparison of
the Indian and Swiss Perspectives, 5 INDIAN J. ARB. L. 7, 9 (2016).
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is significant as the international nature of the dispute (number of
international parties) does not have a bearing on how the
Arbitration Act treats the award rendered as a result of the
dispute.56 The nature of the award is determined on the basis of the
seat of arbitration and not based on the international or domestic
status of its parties.57 This framework has allowed even domestic
parties to choose seats of arbitration outside India and have these
awards enforced as foreign arbitral awards.58 High Court decisions
have largely supported this practice with a few exceptions59 and the
Supreme Court has not made any conclusive pronouncements on
the issue.60 While the decision of one High Court in India is not
binding on others, the prevailing jurisprudence allows domestic
parties to choose foreign seats of arbitration. 61 When an foreign
party is involved, it is unquestionably clear that parties can choose
a foreign seat of arbitration.
In India, the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is governed
by Part II of the Arbitration Act. Section 48 of this Part applies
Article V of the New York Convention to India and contains the
public policy exception.62 A key difference between Article V and
section 48 in the context of the public policy exception is that the
latter explains what comprises public policy. As of 2020, the
constituents of an award in violation of public policy have been
exhaustively defined as awards that are either the result of any fraud
Id.
Id.
58
See GE Power Conversion India v. Pasl Wind Sols. Priv. Ltd., (2020) Petition
under Arbitration Act No. 131/2019 (India); GMR Energy Ltd. V. Doosan Power
Sys. India, (2017) SCC Online Del 11625 (India); Sasan Power Ltd. v. North Am.
Coal Corp. India Priv. Ltd., First Appeal No. 310/2015 (India).
59
See Shree Jagdamba Agrico Exps. Ltd. v. Addhar Mercantile Priv. Ltd.,
(2015) SCC Online Bom 7752 (India); Seven Islands Shipping v. SAH Petroleums
Ltd., (2012) SCC Online Bom 910 (India).
60
See Tejas Karia, Ila Kapoor & Ananya Aggarwal, Post Amendments: What
Plagues Arbitration in India?, 5 INDIAN J. ARB. L. 230, 240-41 (2016); Vivek Bajaj &
Vinay Butani, Can two Indian Parties agree to foreign seated arbitration?, AZB PARTNERS:
ADVOCS. & SOLICS. (May 5, 2020), https://www.azbpartners.com/bank/can-twoindian-parties-agree-to-foreign-seated-arbitration/
[https://perma.cc/X8VGNAPX].
61
Bajaj & Butani, supra note 60; Sudipto Dey, Arbitration proceedings: Order on
foreign jurisdiction has a caveat, BUS. STANDARD (Nov. 7, 2020, 06:10 IST),
https://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/arbitrationproceedings-order-on-foreign-jurisdiction-has-a-caveat-120110700070_1.html
[https://perma.cc/TE4A-WSU5].
62
Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi, (2020) SCC Online SC 177, ¶¶ 34, 39
(India).
56

57
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of corruption, or in contravention of the fundamental policy of
Indian law, or opposed to the basic notions of justice and morality.63
Section 48 also clarifies that it cannot be used as a basis to review the
merits of a foreign arbitral award. A court’s scope of review is
limited to the findings of the arbitral tribunal and does not extend to
scrutinising the basis of those findings or reviewing the rationale of
the arbitral tribunal in arriving at them. This refinement of the
public policy exception under the Arbitration Act was effected
through an amendment to it in 2015. 64 The circumstances
necessitating the 2015 amendment were created by judicial decisions
that broadly applied the public policy exception. These decisions
also shed light on the underlying uncertainty of the Indian Courts’
approach to enforcing foreign awards. The evolution of the
application of the public policy exception in India has been
discussed below through case laws. These case laws have
influenced India’s arbitration law not only by establishing precedent
but also guiding legislative action.
a. Setting the Course of History—the Renusagar Decision
The case of Renusagar v. General Electric 65 (Renusagar) was
decided by the Supreme Court in 1993, three years before the 1996
Arbitration Act came into effect. The law in force that governed the
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards at that time was the Foreign
Awards (Enforcement and Recognition) Act, 1961. 66 Like the
Arbitration Act, the Foreign Awards Act was also enacted to give
effect to the New York Convention.67 The provisions of the Foreign
Awards Act for the objections to the enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards are essentially the same as that of the Arbitration Act. The
public policy exception in the Foreign Awards Act was contained in
section 7(1)(b)(ii). The provisions of section 7 of the Foreign Awards
Act and section 48 of the Arbitration Act are substantially the same

Arbitration Act, supra note 24, ¶ 48(2)(b).
Amendments to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996, No. 3, Acts of
Parliament, 2016 [hereinafter Arbitration Amendment].
65
Renusagar Power Co. v. General Electric Co., (1993) 3 SCR 22 (India).
66
Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, No. 45, Act of
Parliament, 1961 [hereinafter Awards Act].
67
Id. at Preamble.
63

64
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and are considered in pari materia. 68 A recent Supreme Court
judgement (discussed in detail in Part IV) has held that precedents
set in the context of section 7 of the Foreign Awards Act will apply
to section 48 of the Arbitration Act.69 This is why the Renusagar case
continues to be extensively relied on by High Courts and the
Supreme Court even though it was not decided under the current
commercial arbitration law.70
The facts of Renusagar concerned provisions of the Indian foreign
exchange law which were prevalent at that time and will be
discussed in Part IV. Here, the discussion will focus on the
interpretation of the public policy exception given under the
Renusagar case. In Renusagar, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
it was impossible to come up with an accurate definition of public
policy. 71 The court cited its own precedent which explained the
meaning of the concept in broad terms. Public policy referred to
matters concerning the public good and public interest, but the court
acknowledged that the notions of public interest were itself
temporal and bound to vary with time. 72 Although the Supreme
Court could not define the concept, the court addressed three
important questions surrounding it:
1. whether the public policy exception referred to the
public policy of India or public policy under private
international law;
2. whether the exception ought to be construed narrowly or
broadly; and
3. whether a violation of law would amount to a
contravention of public policy.
As discussed above, the Foreign Awards Act used the same
grounds for refusing the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award as
Article V of the New York Convention. However, there was a small
difference in how the public policy exception was phrased in both
68
Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi, (2020) SCC Online SC 177, ¶¶ 34, 39
(India); David Tarh-Akong Eyongndi, An Appraisal of Perennial Hurdles in the
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in Nigeria and India, 10 RMLNLU J. 84, 104-05 (2018).
69
Shri Lal Mahal Ltd. v. Progetto Grano SPA, (2014) 2 SCC 433, ¶ 28 (India);
Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi, (2020) SCC Online SC 177, ¶¶ 35, 39 (India).
70
Shri Lal Mahal Ltd. v. Progetto Grano SPA, (2014) 2 SCC 433, ¶ 28 (India);
Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi, (2020) SCC Online SC 177, ¶¶ 34, 39 (India).
71
See Renusagar Power Co. v. General Electric Co., (1993) 3 SCR 22, ¶ 46
(India).
72
Id. ¶¶ 46-49.
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provisions. Under Article V, the exception referred the “contrary to
the public policy of that country” where the award’s enforcement
was being sought. 73 Differing from this wording, the Foreign
Awards Act simply stated that a “contravention of public policy”
could be used as a reason by a court to withhold a foreign award’s
enforcement in India. This raised a question about the scope of
public policy under the Foreign Awards Act, specifically whether
section 7 was referring to public policy in the context of international
private law or the public policy of India.
The party opposing the enforcement of the foreign arbitral
award contended that the text of section 7 of the Foreign Awards
Act needed to be interpreted as conferring an expansive definition
to the phrase “public policy” and one that would go beyond the
public policy of India. Article V of the New York Convention clearly
stated that an award contravening the public policy of the enforcing
jurisdiction need not be enforced by the respective court. Section 7
did not have such a qualification for its public policy exception and
only referred to public policy as an exception without specifying
whether it was referring to the public policy of India. The Supreme
Court rejected this argument and held that the intention behind not
explicitly stating which public policy comprised an exception under
the Foreign Awards Act could not have been to deviate from the
New York Convention. The Foreign Awards Act was enacted with
the objective of enforcing the provisions of the New York
Convention. 74 Hence, an assumption that an absence of a
qualification of public policy was intended to go against the
provisions the New York Convention would be untenable. The
Supreme Court also referred to the United Kingdom Arbitration Act
of 1975 which was also enacted to enforce the New York
Convention. The public policy exception in the UK Arbitration Act
also did not explicitly refer to the public policy of England.
However, the interpretation and application of the provision was
still limited to the public policy of the England. A key reason for
this was that courts in the UK were not adequately equipped to
inquire into the public policy of other jurisdictions.75 In Renusagar,
the court also found practical difficulties in using the standard of
international public policy, because it would be more difficult to

73
74
75

New York Convention, supra note 46, art. V(2)(b).
Awards Act, supra note 66, at Preamble.
Renusagar Power Co. v. General Electric Co., (1993) 3 SCR 22, ¶ 44 (India).
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define and prone to subjective interpretation by different states. 76
Based on all these reasons, the Supreme Court in Renusagar
confirmed that the public policy exception was concerned with
contraventions of India’s public policy.
After resolving the question of which public policy could be a
consideration for refusing to enforce an award, the Renusagar bench
determined the manner in which the public policy exception should
be applied. Precedent from England showed that there were two
approaches to construing the exception: the broad view and the
narrow view.77 The key distinction between the two views is the
level of judicial intervention permissible under each of them. The
narrow view requires courts to be judicious in their application of
the exception and refrain from adding to the constituents of public
policy. 78 The broad view allows courts more latitude to include
different heads under the public policy exception. 79 When
Renusagar was being decided, the Supreme Court had already
criticised the broad view of the exception because it enabled judicial
activism and allowed for the courts to decide the contents of the law
rather than interpret it.80 However, the Supreme Court’s position
was not consistent; some decisions prior to Renusagar did not ascribe
to the narrow view and preferred the broad view.81 The Renusagar
court decided to adopt the narrow view and held that the design of
the Foreign Awards Act was meant to facilitate the smooth
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. In order to reach its
conclusion, Renusagar referred to precedent from the United States82
which emphasised the pro-enforcement framework of the New York
Convention. 83 The U.S. Supreme Court had concluded that
countries cannot expect to access the benefits of international trade
and foreign markets (and capital) based on their own terms and laws

Id. ¶¶ 62-63.
Id. ¶ 48.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.; see Gherulal Parakh v. Mahadeodas Maiya, AIR 1959 SC 781, 22-23
(India); Egerton v. Brownlow (1853) 4 H.L.C. 1.
81
Renusagar Power Co. v. General Electric Co., (1993) 3 SCR 22, ¶ 49; see
Murlidhar Agarwal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR, 1974 SC 1924 (India).
82
Renusagar Power Co. v. General Electric Co, (1993) 3 SCR 22, ¶ 59 (India);
see Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
83
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
76

77
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alone.84 The same rationale would apply to the dispute resolution
mechanism for matters related to international trade; a country
could not have all disputes relating to it or its residents decided
based on its own domestic laws.85
The Supreme Court then turned to the question of the
implications of a foreign arbitral award violating Indian laws. In
Renusagar the Supreme Court compared the Foreign Awards Act to
the Geneva Convention of 1927 and the Protocol & Convention Act
of 1837. The public policy exception in these laws differentiated
between a country’s public policy and its laws; either could be
independently used as a basis to refuse the enforcement of an award
by a court. Contrastingly, the Foreign Awards Act referred to public
policy “and” the law of India.86 In Renusagar, the Supreme Court
held that because public policy was not equivalent to the law of
India, a violation of a law alone will not warrant the application of
the public policy exception. 87 Importantly, the public policy
exception could not be used to replicate the result of a domestic
adjudication. Even if the foreign award reaches a different
conclusion than a domestic court would have, this cannot be the
basis for rejecting the enforcement of the arbitral award.88 In order
to add more clarity to the limits of the public policy exception,
Renusagar provided three instances when an award could be set
aside on the grounds public policy:
1. when it contravenes the fundamental policy of Indian
law; or
2. the interests of India; or
3. justice and morality.
The Renusagar case, and its three-pronged conceptualisation of
the public policy exception, have reverberated through India’s
commercial arbitration jurisprudence for over two decades. As
already discussed, the Arbitration Act treats domestic awards and
foreign seated awards differently. The counter part of section 48
(foreign arbitral awards) for the purpose of domestic arbitral awards
84
Id.; Renusagar Power Co.v. General Electric Co., (1993) 3 SCR 22, ¶ 59
(India); see Eyongndi, supra note 68, at 103.
85
Renusagar Power Co. v. General Electric Co., (1993) 3 SCR 22, ¶ 59 (India).
86
Id. ¶ 66.
87
Id. ¶ 65.
88
Id. ¶ 60; see Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614 (1985).
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is section 34. When the Act was introduced in 1996, sections 34 and
48 contained the same provisions, seemingly implying that domestic
seated and foreign seated arbitral awards would be enforceable
based on the same criteria. Despite Renusagar, the broad view for
the application of the public policy exception started taking root in
the context of foreign arbitral awards on account of the similarities
between sections 48 and 34.
b. Fluctuations in the Conception of Public Policy Under the
Arbitration Act, 1996
The Renusagar case has been applied by the Supreme Court in
subsequent decisions to support both the broad and narrow views
for the application of the public policy exception. This itself is a
testament to the unpredictability of the reach of public policy in the
context of international commercial arbitration. The judiciary’s
reins on the concept of public policy were first relaxed in the case of
ONGC v. Saw Pipes.89 Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), an
Indian corporation majority owned by the government, had issued
a tender for the supply of pipes for one of its projects. Saw Pipes,
also an Indian corporation, was selected to supply these pipes to
ONGC, but because of a general steel workers’ strike across Europe,
Saw Pipes was unable to procure the raw material to supply ONGC
with the pipes on time. ONGC granted Saw Pipes a forty-five-day
extension to make their delivery provided that liquidated damages
for the delay in supply (per the contract) were deducted from the
consideration payable by ONGC.
Saw Pipes disputed this
deduction and the matter was referred to domestic arbitration.
The domestic arbitral tribunal found that there were other
causes to the delay experienced by ONGC in its project and that it
had suffered no losses from Saw Pipes’ late delivery. The tribunal
used the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and case laws to hold that ONGC
had to show that it had suffered damages in order to claim the
liquidated damages, which it had not done. Accordingly, it held
that the deducted amount from Saw Pipes’ consideration had to be
returned with an interest of twelve percent. The enforcement of this
award was challenged before the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court reviewed the decision of the arbitral tribunal and held that it
had erroneously applied Indian law and the terms of the contract to
89

Oil & Nat. Gas Corp. v. SAW Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705 (India).
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make its award and held the award to be “patently illegal.” It was
stated that the illegality must go to the root of the matter and not
simply be an erroneous application of the law. Further, the
enforceability of liquidated damages is also not a settled question
under Indian law.90 The Supreme Court here was making an active
choice to prefer its application and interpretation of the law over that
of the arbitral tribunal. However, before the Supreme Court could
act on its finding that the award was patently illegal; it had to
establish that public policy under section 34 of the Arbitration Act
permitted the inclusion of new categories under it.
On the question of the scope of public policy under section 34,
the Supreme Court differentiated it from section 48 of the
Arbitration Act and section 7 of the Foreign Awards Act. By doing
this, the ONGC court restricted the application of Renusagar’s ruling
that the public policy exception ought to be applied narrowly to
foreign arbitral awards alone. The basis of this distinction was that
foreign awards are brought before Indian courts only for the
purpose of deciding their enforcement and not their validity, “in
foreign arbitration, the award would be subject to being set aside or
suspended by the competent authority under the relevant law of
that country whereas in the domestic arbitration the only recourse
is to Section 34.”91
A foreign award’s validity can be challenged before the foreign
court which has jurisdiction at the relevant seat of arbitration.
However, for domestic awards, Indian courts are the only fora
where the award can be challenged both in the context of their
enforcement and their validity.92 Accordingly, the Supreme Court
added “patent illegality” as the fourth category to Renusagar’s

90
T.T. Arvind, The ‘Transplant Effect’ in Harmonization, 59 INT’L & COMPAR.
L.Q. 65, 76 (2010).
91
Oil & Nat. Gas Corp. v. SAW Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705, ¶ 11 (India).
Although the drafting of section 34 and 48 of the Arbitration Act is almost identical,
there is nevertheless a basic and, indeed, a very vital difference between ‘refusing
enforcement’ and ‘setting aside’ of an arbitral award. Enforcement, be it of a court
decree or an award, is a stage which comes after a decree or an award has attained
finality. Section 34 deals, not with enforcement, but setting aside of an award. It is
Section 36 of the Arbitration Act which deals with enforcement of a domestic award
after it has become final. This difference between ‘refusing enforcement’ and
‘setting aside’ of an arbitral award can also be noted from the Explanatory Note
prepared by UNCITRAL to the Model Law. See Sidharth Sharma, Public Policy
Under the Indian Arbitration Act: In Defence of the Indian Supreme Court’s Judgment in
ONGC v. Saw Pipes, 26 J. INT’L ARB. 133 (2009).
92
Oil & Nat. Gas Corp. v. SAW Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705, ¶ 11 (India).
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existing three categories of public policy. In ONGC v. Western Geco,93
the scope of public policy was further expanded to include the
reasonableness of an award under it. This was done by broadly
interpreting the first category of public policy (fundamental policy
of India) under Renusagar.94 The cases of Saw Pipes and Western Geco
were in the context of domestic arbitration and did not venture into
interpreting the scope of the public policy under section 48
(enforcement of foreign arbitral awards).
In 2011, the Supreme Court, in the case of Phulchand v. O.O.O.
Patriot, 95 held that the broad view of the public policy exception
under section 34 could be expanded and applied to section 48 of the
Arbitration Act.96 This meant that a foreign arbitral award could be
set aside if a court found that it was patently illegal. In Phulchand
the Supreme Court probed the merits of the award and ultimately
found that it was not patently illegal.97 However, by giving itself the
liberty to consider setting aside a foreign arbitral award on the
grounds of patent illegality, the Phulchand court set a dangerous
precedent. This decision emboldened parties to object to the
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards on the grounds that they
contravened the terms of the underlying contract between parties.
This would make awards patently illegal as the Arbitration Act
requires that tribunals decide cases while considering terms of the
contract.98 An attempt to set aside a foreign arbitral award based on
patent illegality was made in the case of Shri Lal Mahal v. Progetto.99
The appellant had asked the Supreme Court to set aside a foreign
arbitral award based on the Phulchand and Saw Pipes decisions.100
Though the judge who authored the Phulchand decision was on the
Progetto bench, the Supreme Court in Progetto overruled
Phulchand. 101 The Progetto court held that the law laid down by
Oil & Nat. Gas Corp. v. Western Geco Int’l Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 263 (India).
Varuna Bhanrale, Ashish Kabra & Vyapak Desai, India: Widened Scope Of
“Public Policy” Leaves Arbitral Awards Susceptible To Further Scrutiny By Courts,
MONDAQ (Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.mondaq.com/india/trials-appealscompensation/347164/widened-scope-of-public-policy-leaves-arbitral-awardssusceptible-to-further-scrutiny-by-courts [https://perma.cc/R4YU-N2UG].
95
Phulchand Exps. Ltd. v. OOO Patriot, (2011) 10 SCC 300, ¶ 12-13 (India).
96
Id.
97
Id. ¶ 22.
98
Arbitration Act, supra note 24, at 28(3).
99
Shri Lal Mahal Ltd. v. Progetto Grano SPA, (2014) 2 SCC 433, ¶ 69 (India).
100
Id. ¶¶ 27, 30.
101
Id. ¶ 30.
93
94
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Phulchand was incorrect and that the narrow interpretation
mandated by the Renusagar court would apply to the public policy
exception under section 48. 102 Thus, the broad approach to
interpreting the public policy exception was once again restricted to
the context of enforcing domestic awards. This also meant that
patent illegality would only be a ground to reject the enforcement of
domestic arbitral awards and not foreign ones.103
The judicial developments discussed above drew attention to the
public policy exception and the enforcement of arbitral awards in
India. The Law Commission of India, in its August 2014 Report (and
a Supplementary Report which was published shortly thereafter),104
agreed with the Supreme Court decision in Progetto and stated that
increased court intervention is only legitimate in arbitration that is
purely domestic in nature, i.e., where there is no international party
involved. In other words, the Law Commission favoured a
narrower application of the public policy exception to enforcement
of arbitral awards in India-seated international commercial
arbitrations105 which are considered to be domestic awards under
the Arbitration Act. 106 The Report noted that the judiciary’s
approach prior to Progetto in cases such as Saw Pipes and Phulchand
was not arbitration friendly and went against the ethos of the New
York Convention. The Law Commission Report recommended
amendments to sections 34 and 48 to streamline the use of the public
policy exception.
Both sections were amended to include
Renusagar’s three-pronged enumeration of public policy except for
the category referring to “the interests of India.” The Law
Commission found that this category was vague and amenable to
broader application and interpretational misuse.107 The final three
Id. ¶¶ 27, 30.
Id.
104
LAW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 47; LAW COMM’N OF INDIA,
SUPPLEMENTARY TO REPORT NO.246 ON AMENDMENTS TO ARBITRATION AND
CONCILIATION ACT, 1996: “PUBLIC POLICY,” (2015) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTARY
REPORT].
105
Arbitration Act, supra note 24, § 2(1)(f) (defining “international commercial
arbitration”).
106
Arbitration Act, supra note 24, § 2(7), provides that “. . . [a]n arbitral award
made under this Part [Part I of the Act] shall be considered as a domestic award.”
Section 2(2) states that Part I “. . . shall apply where the place of arbitration is in
India.”
107
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 104, at 7 (“…in its 2003 decision . . . the
Supreme Court opened the floodgates so far as judicial interference in arbitrations
was concerned.”).
102
103
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enumerations of the public policy exception under sections 34 and
48 proposed by the Report included an award effected by (1) fraud
and corruption; or (2) against the fundamental policy of Indian law;
or (3) in contravention to the basic principles of morality and
justice. 108 The proposed amendment was meant to make the
definition of public policy exhaustive. A contravention of public
policy could occur only if the award met any of the three criteria
mentioned above. As for the “patent illegality” criteria added by
Saw Pipes, the Report recommended that the same be retained but
decoupled from the notion of public policy. It was suggested that
patent illegality be added to section 34 through a separate provision
and applied as a ground to set aside arbitral awards arising out of
arbitrations other than international commercial arbitrations. This
would prevent any misconception that patent illegality falls under
the public policy exception or that it can be used to set aside a foreign
award under section 48. The Supplementary Report went one step
further and recommended that section 34 should explicitly state that
courts are not allowed to review an award on its merit to decide
whether it falls within the “fundamental policy of Indian law”
category of the public policy exception. 109 This recommendation
was made to directly address the expansive interpretation Western
Geco had given to the fundamental policy of Indian law under the
public policy exception. By prohibiting the review of an award’s
merits, the Report intended to prevent courts from setting aside
awards on the grounds of unreasonableness or any other
disagreement with the approach taken by the arbitral tribunal.110
The Government of India accepted all the recommendations of
the Law Commission Report and Supplementary Report, which
were followed by Parliament’s enactment of the Arbitration and
Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015. 111 Parliament’s amendment
went one step further and applied the Supplemental Report’s
recommendation for section 34 to section 48 as well.112 As the law
currently stands, the public policy exception is exhaustively defined
through three headings recommended by the Report under section
34 and section 48, and patent illegality is a separate ground under
section 34 to set aside an arbitral award passed in India-seated
108
109
110
111
112

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 47, at 14.
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 104, at 19-20.
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 104, at 14-15, 19-20.
Arbitration Amendment, supra note 64.
Arbitration Amendment, supra note 64, § 34, § 48.
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arbitrations (domestic arbitral awards) other than international
commercial arbitrations.113 Enforcement of a foreign arbitral award
can now be refused under section 48 on the grounds of violating the
public policy of India only if the award:
1. is a result of fraud or corruption; or
2. contravenes the fundamental policy of Indian law; or
3. opposes the most basic notions of justice or morality.114
Finally, the amendment ensured that the court cannot review the
merits of an award in order to decide whether or not it is in
contravention to the fundamental policy of India. A bare reading of
the amended text of the Arbitration Act conveys an expectation of
judicial restraint, especially in the context of setting aside foreign
arbitration awards. The Amendment Act was considered a step
towards a pro-enforcement direction for commercial arbitration in
India.115
c. Regressive Currents in India’s Arbitration Waters: NAFED v.
Alimenta
The mandate of the amended Arbitration Act greatly clarified
the standard by which foreign arbitral awards based on put options
are enforced in India by the judiciary. Before looking at the
evolution of the judicial interpretations of the public policy
exception in the context of the foreign exchange law, this Part will
conclude with an overview of the Supreme Court’s recent decision
in National Agricultural Cooperative Market Federation in India
(“NAFED”) v. Alimenta. 116 This case is important as it marks yet
another turn in the Indian judiciary’s approach to the public policy
exception and could potentially make courts regress to the broad
approach of the exception’s application.
NAFED (an Indian canalizing agency) entered into a contract
with Alimenta (a U.S. company) to ship 5,000 metric tonnes of
groundnuts (commodity).
Only 1,900 metric tonnes of the
Arbitration Act, supra note 24, § 34(2A).
Arbitration Act, supra note 24, § 48(2).
115
Tercier & Devitre, supra note 55, at 25.
116
Nat’l Agric. Coop. Mktg. Fed’n of India v. Alimenta S.A., (2020) SCC
Online SC 381 (India).
113
114
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commodity could be shipped in the time period stipulated in the
contract. The shipment of the remaining 3,100 tonnes was delayed
on account of cyclones in India that affected crop yield.117 After a
series of addendums, it was agreed that the remaining 3,100 tonnes
would be shipped by NAFED in the year 1980-81, instead of 1979-80
as initially envisioned by the contract. 118 NAFED was prevented
from shipping the commodity as agreed to in the addendum
because of a government prohibition in place. The prohibition
prevented carrying over exports for one year into another after 1980
without government permission. NAFED stated that it did not
realise that it required government permission to enter into the
addendum where it committed to ship the commodity in the year
1980-81. NAFED had assumed that the permission granted to it in
the period of 1977-80 would be carried over to the next year as it was
the same contract being executed.119 When NAFED was unable to
deliver the remaining amount of the commodity, Alimenta opted for
arbitration (seated in London) and was awarded damages payable
by NAFED.120
When the Supreme Court of India considered the enforcement
of the arbitral award in NAFED, it had to do so under the Foreign
Awards Act, as the case arose before the Arbitration Act was
enacted. Despite using the provisions of the Foreign Awards Act,
NAFED remains relevant because previous Supreme Court
decisions have used case laws under the Foreign Awards Act to
interpret the public policy exception under section 48 of the
Arbitration Act.121 It has been held that the public policy exception
under the Foreign Awards Act is pari materia or substantially similar
to those under section 48 of the Arbitration Act.122 In NAFED, the
Supreme Court did not restrict itself to precedent relating to the
Foreign Award Act and traversed cases from Renusagar to Progetto.
NAFED’s final interpretation of the public policy exception is thus
an authoritative application of the precedent it has relied on. Even
though the Foreign Award Act is no longer applicable, NAFED’s
Id. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 6-7.
119
Id. ¶ 8.
120
Id. ¶ 22.
121
Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi, (2020) SCC Online SC 177 (India);
Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings v. Unitech Ltd., (2017) SCC Online Del 7810 (India).
122
Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi, (2020) SCC Online SC 177, ¶¶ 34,
39 (India); Nat’l Agric. Coop. Mktg. Fed’n of India v. Alimenta S.A., (2020) SCC
Online SC 381, ¶ 67 (India).
117

118
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interpretation of Supreme Court precedent on the Arbitration Act
(to support the broad approach taken by it) can be used in the
context of other cases under the Arbitration Act. 123 Accordingly,
NAFED has the potential to influence the application of the public
policy exception under section 48 in future cases.
When the Supreme Court considered the enforcement of the
arbitral award in favour of Alimenta, it took an approach that was
closer to the Saw Pipes decision (which permitted courts to broadly
construe the public policy exception) than the Progetto decision
(which required courts to narrowly apply the public policy
exception). Going against its own precedent, the Supreme Court in
NAFED reviewed the facts of the case and the merits of the award.
It used the Indian Contract Act and Indian case laws to state that the
conclusion reached by the arbitrator that NAFED owed damages to
Alimenta was untenable and incorrect. This was despite the fact the
law applicable to the construction of the contract based on the
agreement between the parties (and quoted by the Supreme Court)
was English contract law.
After detailing why the award was incorrect, the Supreme Court
set it aside on the grounds that it was opposed to the fundamental
policy of India relating to exports. This conclusion was reached
based on the apparent infirmities of the award as identified by
NAFED and the fact that shipping a regulated commodity would
contravene the government’s export regulations.124 This is another
instance of where the fundamental policy of India has been applied
broadly. The Supreme Court identified export policy and laws as
being a part of the fundamental policy of India. 125 However, it
remains unclear what separates this policy from others. As
mentioned above, this judgement was rendered under the Foreign
Awards Act and some writers have stated that for this reason, it will
not be binding on future benches of the Supreme Court.126 Others
123
Shaneen Parikh & Surya Sambyal, Enforcement of Foreign Awards in India—
Have the Brakes been Applied?, CYRIL AMARCHAND MANGALDAS: INDIA CORP. L. (Apr.
27, 2020), https://corporate.cyrilamarchandblogs.com/2020/04/enforcement-offoreign-awards-in-india-have-the-brakes-been-applied/
[https://perma.cc/AA4U-T92T].
124
Nat’l Agric. Coop. Mktg. Fed’n of India v. Alimenta S.A., (2020) SCC
Online SC 381, ¶¶ 68-69 (India).
125
Id.
126
S. Sreesh, India: Enforcement Of Foreign Arbitral Awards—Scope Of Public
Policy And Recent Developmental Perspectives, MONDAQ (Sept. 2, 2020),
https://www.mondaq.com/india/trials-appeals-
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suggest that the case can be used to justify a broader application of
the public policy exception when deciding on the enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards. 127 NAFED thus gives rise to legitimate
concerns. At the very least, it is safe to say that NAFED
demonstrates the malleability of the Supreme Court’s proenforcement approach.128
Having discussed the scope and limitations of the public policy
exception and the Indian judiciary’s approach to enforcing foreign
awards, this Article now turns to the question of foreign arbitral
awards that deal with put options. The Indian Supreme Court and
High Courts have successfully kept such awards out of the reach of
the public policy exception, but there are unique challenges to
enforcing awards relating to put options in India. The next Part
discusses all of these issues in detail.
IV. ENFORCING PUT OPTIONS THROUGH FOREIGN ARBITRAL
AWARDS
The approach taken by the High Courts and the Supreme Court
in enforcing arbitral awards relating to put option clauses has been
a liberal one that has deferred to the reasoning of arbitral tribunals
and strictly applied the public policy exception. This has been
grounded in the permissive nature of India’s current foreign
exchange regulatory regime (as discussed below) and the courts’
refusal to interfere with the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards,

compensation/981256/enforcement-of-foreign-arbitral-awards--scope-of-publicpolicy-and-recent-developmental-perspectives?type=mondaqai&score=74
[https://perma.cc/N9EZ-4BM2]; Sathvik Chandrashekar, The Indian Supreme
Court’s Judgment in NAFED v. Alimenta S.A.: Retrogressive or Wholly Irrelevant?
Implications for India’s Pro-Arbitration Project, AM. REV. INT’L ARB.: BLOG (July 21,
2020),
http://aria.law.columbia.edu/the-indian-supreme-courts-judgment-innafed-v-alimenta-s-a-retrogressive-or-wholly-irrelevant-implications-for-indiaspro-arbitration-project/ [https://perma.cc/E48L-8PZG].
127
See Parikh & Sambyal, supra note 123; R. Harikrishnan, NAFED v. Alimenta
S.A.: Has the Indian Supreme Court Opened a Pandora’s Box on Enforcement of Foreign
Awards?,
KLUWER
ARB.
BLOG
(July
11,
2020),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2020/07/11/nafed-v-alimenta-s-ahas-the-indian-supreme-court-opened-a-pandoras-box-on-enforcement-offoreign-awards/ [https://perma.cc/K6SD-7FUP].
128
Parikh & Sambyal, supra note 123; Harikrishnan, supra note 127.
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especially after the 2015 amendment of the Arbitration Act. 129
Despite the courts’ pro-enforcement approach, challenges to
ensuring a stable and predictable regulatory environment for
investors remain. This Part examines these challenges through
important case laws decided by the High Courts and the Supreme
Court of India. Before delving into individual cases, the following
discussion outlines the foreign exchange laws governing put options
exercisable by foreign investors in India.
a. Regulatory Framework Under the Foreign Exchange Management
Act
India’s parent foreign exchange law is the Foreign Exchange
Management Act, 1999 (FEMA). 130
FEMA is principally
administered by the RBI which is endowed with delegated
legislative powers to frame regulations and issue directions under
the Act; on certain aspects, the power vests with the Central
Government which makes rules. 131 Accordingly, put options are
governed by provisions under FEMA and delegated legislations
such as rules, regulations and circulars as issued thereunder and
amended from time to time (collectively referred to as FEMA
Regulations). The following discussion maps current laws and
regulations governing put options exercisable by foreign investors
in India.
The current scheme of regulation 132 under FEMA is that a
transaction is prohibited unless (i) it is covered by a general
129
The current regulatory regime does not impose absolute prohibitions and
retains a room for discretionary approvals by the Central Bank. “Permissive” in the
context of India’s foreign exchange regime, therefore, does not refer to leniency.
Rather it is a key feature of India’s foreign exchange regulations which do not
declare all transactions that contravene it to be void. The RBI has the ability to
permit a transaction that goes against foreign exchange regulations.
130
Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 [hereinafter FEMA].
131
See id. Sections 11 and 47 deal with powers of the RBI to issue directions
and frame regulations. The Central Government has powers to make rules under
§ 46 of FEMA.
132
This regulatory scheme can be gathered from the express provision under
FEMA §3(a)-(c), which states:

Save as otherwise provided in this Act, rules or regulations made
thereunder, or with the general or special permission of the Reserve Bank,
no person shall–(a) deal in or transfer any foreign exchange or foreign
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statutory or regulatory permission or (ii) the RBI gives special
permission for the transaction. Thus, under FEMA there are three
permissible means of dealing in foreign exchange, the first is
through any transaction that has been allowed by FEMA itself, the
second is through transactions that are covered by the general
permission under FEMA Regulations, and the third is through
transactions for which special permission of the RBI has been
obtained.
Furthermore, there is an important distinction between the
regulatory approach under FEMA to a capital account transaction
and a current account transaction. Section 2(e) of FEMA defines
“capital account transactions” to include “a transaction which alters
the assets or liabilities, including contingent liabilities, outside India
of persons resident in India or assets or liabilities in India of persons
resident outside India.” Section 2(j) of FEMA defines “current
account transactions” generally as “a transaction other than a capital
account transaction” including some illustrative transactions
specified in the section.
Section 5 of FEMA permits dealings in foreign exchange which
are a part of current account transactions, subject to “such
reasonable restrictions for current account transactions as may be
prescribed” by the Central Government in consultation with the RBI
and in the public interest.133 Therefore, the regulatory approach to
current account transactions appears to be more liberal inasmuch as
they are permissible as long as they are not prohibited. In contrast,
capital account transactions are more closely regulated by FEMA.
Section 6 of FEMA allows dealing in foreign exchange for a capital
account transaction. The class or classes of capital account
transactions which are permissible have to be specified by the RBI and
the Central Government in consultation with each other. Until
October 2019, the RBI was empowered to frame regulations to allow,
in consultation with the Central Government, the classes of capital
security to any person not being an authorised person; (b) make any
payment to or for the credit of any person resident outside India in any
manner . . . .”
Accordingly, the RBI has an overarching, discretionary power to grant special
permission for any dealing in, or transfer of, foreign exchange or of a foreign
security or payment to any person resident outside India that falls within FEMA
and is not generally permitted under FEMA, its rules or any of the regulations
framed by the RBI. The Indian Supreme Court has recognized that special
permission can be given by the RBI even ex post facto. See Life Ins. Corp. of India v.
Escorts Ltd., (1986) 1 SCC 264, ¶ 65 (India).
133
FEMA, supra note 130, § 5.
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account transactions along with conditions such as the set limit up
to which they are permissible.134 Pursuant to certain amendments
to FEMA notified in October 2019, the power to specify permissible
capital account transactions involving “debt instruments” now vests
in the RBI whereas those involving non-debt instruments (e.g.,
equity instruments) rests with the Central Government which has to
consult with the RBI. 135 Thus, in so far as capital account
transactions are concerned, unless the RBI and the Central
Government have specified them to be permissible, they are
considered to be prohibited, except where a special permission is
sought and granted. Prior to the 2019 Amendments to FEMA,
Section 6(3) of FEMA gave an illustrative list of the classes of capital
account transactions that the RBI is empowered to prohibit, restrict
or regulate. One such class of capital account transaction was
“transfer or issue of any security by a person resident outside
India.”136 Under Section 47 of FEMA, the RBI had the general power
to make regulations in relation to, inter alia, “the permissible classes
of capital account transactions, the limits of admissibility of foreign
exchange for such transactions . . . and the prohibition, restriction or
regulation of such capital account transactions under Section 6.”137
Put options contemplate capital account transactions because,
when exercised by the foreign investor, they result in a transfer of
security (shares) by the non-resident shareholder, thereby
constituting a transaction that alters the assets or liabilities in India
of persons resident outside India. Since they are capital account
transactions, the RBI (prior to the 2019 Amendments) had the
authority to regulate them under FEMA. The RBI regulated each
class of permissible capital account transactions by way of separate
regulations made for the class. Using its power to regulate “transfer
or issue of any security by a person resident outside India” under
the then in force Section 6(3)(b) and Section 47 of FEMA, the RBI
FEMA, supra note 130, § 6.
Ministry of Finance, S.O. 3715(E) (Notified on October 15, 2019)
[hereinafter 2019 Amendments] (India). Consequent to the 2019 Amendments,
sections 6, 46, and 47 of FEMA stood amended to provide for the powers of the RBI
and the Central Government to make regulations and rules concerning capital
account transactions involving debt and non-debt instruments respectively. See
FEMA, supra note 130, § 6(2)(a), (2A), read with § 46(2)(a)-(b) and § 47(2)(a).
136 FEMA, supra note 130, § 6(3)(b).
137 FEMA, supra note 130, § 47 (2)(a). After the 2019 Amendments, the RBI’s
power is restricted to debt instruments only; with respect to non-debt instruments,
for example, equity instruments, the regulatory power now vests in the Central
Government.
134
135
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regulated the transfers of securities by a person resident outside
India to a person resident in India through the Foreign Exchange
Management (Transfer or Issue of Security by a Person Resident
Outside India) Regulations (commonly referred to as FEMA 20).138
FEMA 20 contained RBI’s regulations on foreign investment. From
time to time, the RBI also issued Master Directions, 139 which
compiled various instructions issued to Authorised Persons (i.e.,
persons such as banks who are authorized to deal in foreign
exchange) on specific regulations, including foreign investment.140
FEMA 20 permitted investment by persons resident outside
India subject to certain conditions. One such condition was that the
investment and any subsequent share transfer transaction (between
a person resident in India and a person resident outside India) have
to conform to prescribed pricing guidelines. 141 The pricing
guidelines were amended from time to time; the underlying
principle of the pricing guidelines being that the shares, in case of
transfer from a resident to a non-resident should not be less than
their fair market value; and in case of transfer from a non-resident
to a resident should not exceed the fair market value.
The policy objective behind RBI’s pricing guidelines,
particularly in the context of put options, is evident from FEMA 20
itself. First, this is evident in the definition of “capital instruments”
which, under FEMA 20, were eligible for investment by a foreign
investor. The definition of capital instruments, which includes
“equity shares,” recognised that such instruments “can contain an
optionality clause” but should be “without any option or right to
exit at an assured price.”142 Second, a specific “explanation” that was
added to the pricing guidelines in case of transfer of a capital
instrument (e.g., share) from a foreign investor to an Indian party.
The explanation stated that the “guiding principle” for pricing of the
share transfer transaction would be that the person resident outside
138
FEMA 20 was originally framed and notified by the RBI in the year 2000—
“Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of Security by a Person Resident
Outside India) Regulations, May 2000,” as later amended from time to time. These
regulations were substituted by the Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or
Issue of Security by a Person Resident Outside India) Regulations, 2017, FEMA
20(R)/2017-RB (Nov. 7, 2017) [hereinafter FEMA 20].
139
See, e.g., Reserve Bank of India, Master Direction on Foreign Investment in
India, RBI/FED/2017-18/60 (Issued on January 4, 2018) [hereinafter Master
Direction].
140
Id.
141
See FEMA 20, supra note 138, § 11.
142 FEMA 20, supra note 138, § 2(v)(a).
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India (i.e., the foreign investor) is “not guaranteed any assured exit
price at the time of making such investment/agreement” and “shall
exit at the price prevailing at the time of exit.”143
These provisions in FEMA 20 (notified in November 2017)
followed from their predecessor regulations (FEMA 20 notified in
May 2000, and as amended from time to time). The erstwhile FEMA
20 as originally notified in May 2000 did not specifically deal with
transfers pursuant to put options. However, the regulations
mandated compliance with pricing guidelines.144 These guidelines
were notified by the RBI by way of a circular, which set the price for
transfer of shares at fair market value.145
Restrictions on put options were first specifically imposed by the
RBI in December 2013 by amending FEMA 20 (as was in effect at the
time). 146 By this amendment (the 2013 Amendment), the RBI
provided that only shares or convertible debentures “without any
option/right to exit at an assured price” would be recognised as
eligible instruments for investment by non-residents under the
automatic route (without requiring RBI’s prior approval).147 These
restrictions were further reaffirmed and reiterated by the RBI in
amendments to FEMA 20 issued on May 23, 2014 which laid down
the new pricing regulations. 148 The new pricing regulations
reiterated that a foreign investor could exit under a put option clause
provided the exit price did not exceed the fair market value. It
further added that the “guiding principle” would be that the foreign
investor is “not guaranteed any assured exit price at the time of
making such investment/agreements and shall exit at the price
prevailing at the time of exit . . . .”149 This regulatory approach by
143
144

§ 11.

FEMA 20, supra note 138, § 11(3).
See FEMA 20 (as originally notified by the RBI in May 2000), supra note 138,

145
Reserve Bank of India, FEMA—Foreign Direct Investment in India—
Transfer of Shares/Convertible Debentures by Way of Sale—Simplification of
Procedures, A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 16 (Issued on October 4, 2004).
146
Reserve Bank of India, Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue
of Security by a Person Resident Outside India) (Seventeenth Amendment)
Regulations, 2013, FEMA. 294/2013-RB (Issued on November 12, 2013).
147
Id. § 2.
148
See Reserve Bank of India, Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or
Issue of Security by a Person Resident Outside India) (Seventh Amendment)
Regulations, 2014, FEMA. 306/2014-RB (Issued on May 23, 2014).
149
Reserve Bank of India, Foreign Direct Investment—Pricing Guidelines for
FDI Instruments with Optionality Clauses, A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 86 (Issued
on Jan. 9, 2014) [hereinafter 2014 Amendment].
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way of a guiding principle added through the 2014 Amendment was
reiterated in the 2017 version of FEMA 20.150
All this while, the mode or methodology of calculating fair
market value kept changing. 151 Under FEMA 20 (as notified in
November, 2017) the valuation could be done as per any
“internationally accepted pricing methodology for valuation of
shares on an arm’s length basis” duly certified by a Chartered
Accountant or a Securities and Exchange Board of India registered
Merchant Banker or a practicing Cost Accountant, in case of an
unlisted Indian company. 152 In case of a listed company (i.e., a
company whose shares are quoted on the stock exchange), the
pricing had to be worked out as per the guidelines prescribed by the
Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), which is a statutory
body that regulates the securities market in India.153
As mentioned above, after the 2019 Amendments to FEMA154 the
powers of the RBI and the Central Government have been
bifurcated. RBI’s power to regulate capital account transactions are
now limited to “debt instruments” only. For capital account
transactions involving non-debt instruments (such as equity), the
regulatory power is given to the Central Government. In exercise of
150
See FEMA 20, supra note 138; see also Master Direction, supra note 139. The
Master Direction, at ¶ 7.8.1 states: “A person resident outside India holding capital
instruments of an Indian company containing an optionality clause in accordance
with FEMA 20(R) and exercising the option/right, can exit without any assured
return.” At ¶ 8.3.2, it is provided that “the guiding principle would be that the
person resident outside India is not guaranteed any assured exit price at the time
of making such investment/agreement and shall exit at the price prevailing at the
time of exit.”
151
In the 2013 Amendment, the valuation methodology was changed to be
based on the ‘Return on Equity’. In the 2014 Amendment, the methodology for
calculation of fair market value was changed to “any internationally-accepted
pricing methodology for valuation of shares on an arm’s length basis, duly certified
by a chartered accountant or a Security and Exchange Board of India-registered
merchant banker.” This is the methodology which was followed in FEMA 20 (as
notified in November 2017) and now the extant rules notified in October 2019 also
provide. Prior to these amendments, the regulations required determination of fair
market value using the Discounted Cash Flow method of valuation. See Res. Bank
of India, Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of Security by a Person
Resident Outside India) (Amendment) Regulations, 2010, FEMA 205/2010-RB
(Issued on April 7, 2010); see also Reserve Bank of India, Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) in India—Transfer of Shares/Preference Shares/Convertible Debentures by
Way of Sale: Revised Pricing Guidelines, A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 49 (Issued
on May 4, 2010).
152
See FEMA 20, supra note 133, § 11(1)(b).
153
See FEMA 20, supra note 133, § 1.
154
See 2019 Amendments, supra note 135.
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this power, the Central Government of India has, in consultation
with the RBI, notified the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-debt
Instruments) Rules, 2019 (Non-Debt Rules 2019).155 The Non-Debt
Rules 2019 have superseded FEMA 20 which governed the field
earlier. However, it is not that the Non-Debt Rules 2019 have
completely overhauled the existing regime. In so far as treatment of
put options and pricing rules are concerned, the regulatory regime
remains the same as it was under FEMA 20. The Non-Debt Rules
2019 reiterate the earlier position that a foreign investor holding any
equity instruments of an Indian company containing an optionality
clause may, in exercise of the option, exit “without any assured
return.” The pricing guidelines contained in these new rules
continue to retain the same valuation methodology and reiterate the
same “guiding principle” that “. . . the person resident outside India
is not guaranteed any assured exit price at the time of making such
investment or agreement and shall exit at the price prevailing at the
time of exit”156 (emphasis added).
From the above, it is evident that the RBI, and now the Central
Government, while allowing put options, continues to keep a tight
control on the price at which the put options can be exercised. This
regulatory approach emanates from concerns, which are
understandable, that put options of equity securities with
guaranteed internal rates of return, as opposed to fair market value
valuations, would have impermissible characteristics of debt. The
concern with non-residents owning and exercising such options
arose from requirements governing incurrence by residents of
“external commercial borrowings,” or “ECB,” which have a number
of conditions attached to them including end-use restrictions,
minimum average maturity, all-in-cost ceilings, etc.157
As stated above, from a policy standpoint the underlying
rationale for the restriction on the price payable by the Indian party
to the foreign investor under put options was that investors should
not be guaranteed any assured returns.158 However, a dichotomy
arises when put options which offer no return and are there only to
provide to the foreign investor a downside risk protection are also
155
Ministry of Finance, S.O. 3732(E) (Notified on October 17, 2019)
[hereinafter Non-Debt Rules].
156
See Non-Debt Rules, supra note 155, §§ 9(5), 21(2)(c)(iii).
157
Reserve Bank of India, Foreign Exchange Management (Borrowing or
Lending in Foreign Exchange) Regulations, 2000, FEMA. 3/2000-RB (Issued on May
3, 2000).
158
See 2014 Amendment, supra note 149, § 2(b)(iii).
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made impermissible. By using the expression “assured exit price”
while explaining the guiding principle (both under FEMA 20 and
under the extant Non-Debt Rules 2019) the pricing guidelines
effectively prevent the exercise of put options where the sale price is
different from the fair market value of the securities. 159 This
approach fails to differentiate between put options with sale prices
guaranteeing assured returns and those that only offer downside
protection that cap the extent of an investor’s losses without
guaranteeing any profits. 160 The pricing guidelines make it
technically impermissible for foreign investors to sell their shares at
anything above the prevailing stock exchange price in a listed
company or, in the case of unlisted companies, at a price not
exceeding the fair market value. Though the mode of calculating
fair value has been changed from time to time,161 the implication is
the same—exit at predetermined prices remain impermissible. It is
in this regulatory backdrop that several cases regarding the
enforceability of arbitral awards based on put option clauses were
decided by the High Courts and Supreme Court. The following
discussion will trace the status of India’s foreign exchange laws
within the public policy exception and then examine individual
cases of High Courts.
b. From Renusagar to Vijay Karia: Decoupling Public Policy and
Foreign Exchange Laws
The Supreme Court decision in Renusagar has been discussed in
Part II in light of its importance for the interpretation of the public
policy exception. The narrow view laid down by it continues to be
prevalent today to the extent that it has been codified in the
Arbitration Act. Despite its restrained approach to the public policy
exception, Renusagar had held that an award whose enforcement
would require a violation of India’s foreign exchange laws would
contravene public policy.162 This portion of the Renusagar ruling was
determined by the facts of the case and the foreign exchange law in
force in India at the time.
159
160
161
162

(India).

See Non-Debt Rules, supra note 155.
See Makkar & Jain, supra note 13, at 400.
See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
See Renusagar Power Co.v. General Electric Co., (1993) 3 SCR 22, ¶ 73-83
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General Electric, a company incorporated in New York, entered
into a contract with Renusagar to supply equipment for a thermal
power plant that Renusagar was constructing. 163 The contract
stipulated that Renusagar would pay ten percent of the
consideration through cash or a Letter of Credit, the remaining
ninety percent was to be paid in sixteen installments (each
installment becoming payable every six months) at an interest rate
of 6.5 percent. This contract required the approval of the
Government of India (as it would entail the outflow of foreign
exchange through payments to General Electric) which was
granted.164 The contract also stipulated the reduction of the interest
from 6.5 to 6 percent if the Government of India would exempt
General Electric from paying taxes on the interest paid to it by
Renusagar.165 The Government of India granted this exemption, but
it was withdrawn two years later and cancelled retrospectively; this
meant that Renusagar had to pay an interest of 6.5 percent on
principle amount.166 Renusagar approached the Delhi High Court
to cancel the Government’s revocation of the exemption. Granting
Renusagar’s request, the Delhi High Court effectively restored the
Government of India’s tax exemption towards General Electric, thus
reducing the interest payable by Renusagar to six percent once
again.167 Despite the Delhi High Court’s order, Renusagar did not
complete the payments of its due installments. Meanwhile, there
were some delays from General Electric’s side for the supply of
equipment. A revised payment schedule was arrived at by the
parties based on which the capitalized interest was calculated using
a longer period of time than what was initially decided. 168 Both
parties agreed to these revised terms but the Government of India
refused to approve the new payment schedule as it would imply an
increased outflow of foreign exchange than the original payment
schedule.169 Renusagar did not make further payments to General
Electric and the latter decided to file for arbitration on account of not

163
164
165
166
167
168
169

Id. ¶ 32.
Id. ¶ 33.
Id.
Id. ¶ 34.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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having received the payment installments. The Arbitral Tribunal
gave an award granting General Electric’s claims.170
The enforcement of the foreign arbitral award was challenged
before the Supreme Court on the grounds that it contravened India’s
public policy by violating its foreign exchange laws. At the time, the
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA) was in force.171 The
objectives of FERA were contained in its Preamble and they were
unequivocal in prioritizing the conservation of India’s foreign
exchange reserves. A country’s right to protect its economic
interests through the use of foreign exchange laws is a recognized
principle in private international law, 172 and it is also a prevalent
practice. 173 The Supreme Court in Renusagar found that all
countries, at some point of their history controlled the flow of their
foreign exchange to cater to their economic interests;174 for instance,
England did this through the Exchange Control Act, 1947
(suspended in 1979). 175 Informed by this context, Renusagar held
that any award that would require a violation of FERA would
contravene India’s public policy. This finding gave the Renusagar
court the imperative to examine whether the foreign award violated
FERA. The Supreme Court found that though the revised payment
schedule was not approved by the Government of India (which was
required under FERA), 176 the original payment schedule was
approved and Renusagar had defaulted in its installment payments
even under that schedule.177 Accordingly, the arbitral tribunal had
correctly awarded damages to General Electric. The Supreme Court
also made use of section 47 of FERA which allowed damages and
debts to be recovered pursuant to a judgment irrespective of the
permissibility of the recovery under the general scheme of FERA.
However, the Government of India needed to approve the recovery
of a sum through a judgement before it could be remitted.178 The
Id. ¶ 40.
The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, No. 46, Acts of Parliament,
1973 (India) [hereinafter FERA].
172
See Renusagar Power Co.v. General Electric Co., (1993) 3 SCR 22, ¶ 74
(India).
173
See id.
174
See id.
175
See id.
176
See id. ¶ 80; FERA, supra note 171, § 9.
177
See Renusagar Power Co.v. General Electric Co., (1993) 3 SCR 22, ¶ 83
(India).
178
Id. ¶ 84.
170

171
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Supreme Court noted that the Government’s refusal to approve a
revised schedule cannot be assumed as a refusal to enforce any
judgement relating to the case as well. Based on this reasoning, it
held that the arbitral award did not violate FERA. Though a
violation of FERA would have amounted to a contravention of
public policy according to Renusagar, no such violation was found
and this allowed the Supreme Court to enforce the foreign arbitral
award.
The portion of the Renusagar award which held that a
contravention of India’s foreign exchange laws would amount to a
violation of public policy has been overruled by the Supreme Court
through its recent judgment in Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi.179 While
the case did not directly relate to put options, the Supreme Court
used a Delhi High Court decision on put options to substantiate its
judgement.180 Vijay Karia dealt with the enforcement of an award
relating to a call option or the right to require shares to be sold at the
sale price.181 Call options are the flip side of put options and confer
a right to require shares to be sold at the sale price.182 In Vijay Karia,
the foreign investors exercised their right to buy shares of an Indian
corporation from an Indian shareholder (Vijay Karia) at the
discounted price.183 Call options, like put options, are also governed
by pricing guidelines.
The Foreign Exchange (Non-Debt
184
Instrument) Rules of 2019 require that transfers of shares from a
resident to a non-resident are made at a price that is prevalent in the
stock exchange or at an arm’s length price as determined through
international pricing methodologies by a Chartered Accountant.185
The sale price explicitly provided for the sale of shares to Prysiman
Cavi at a discount and thus did not meet the requirements of the
pricing guidelines under the Non-Debt Rules of FEMA.
Beyond the permissibility of call options under the Non-Debt
Rules of 2019, the rationale behind objecting to the exercise of this
call option was that lesser foreign exchange would be entering the
179

(India).

See Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi, (2020) SCC Online SC 177

180
Id.; see also Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings v. Unitech Ltd., (2017) SCC
Online Del 7810 (India).
181
See Makkar & Jain, supra note 13, at 401.
182
See Makkar & Jain, supra note 13, at 401.
183
See Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi, (2020) SCC Online SC 177
(India).
184
Id.; see also Non-Debt Rules, supra note 155, § 9(5).
185
See Non-Debt Rules, supra note 155, § 21(2)(b)(iii).
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country as the shares were being bought by the foreign investor at a
discounted price (the sale price). However, the imperative to
regulate call options appears to be a less urgent matter from a
foreign exchange policy perspective as irrespective of the amount,
call options bring some foreign exchange into the country; this was
one of the arguments put forth by Prysmian Cavi, the corporation
which wanted the arbitral award to be enforced.186 Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court used this case to examine the validity of the claim
that any contravention of FEMA would be opposed to the public
policy of India.
Referring to Renusagar, the Supreme Court pointed out that the
objective of India’s foreign exchange laws had changed after the
enactment of FEMA. Foreign exchange control under FEMA is strict
but also permissive. Unlike FERA, there is no provision under
FEMA which states that any contract that violates the Act will be
automatically void. 187 Rather, the scheme of FEMA allows for
violations to be rectified post-facto by seeking permission from the

186

(India).

See Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi, (2020) SCC Online SC 177

187
Id. ¶ 88. See also The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, § 47 (Sept. 19,
1973) (India). It is relevant to mention here that in an earlier judgment, which the
Supreme Court noted in Vijay Karia, the Supreme Court had emphasised that

insofar as conservation and/or augmentation of foreign exchange is
concerned, the restrictions in FEMA continue to be as rigorous as they
were in FERA. FEMA continues with the regime of rigorous control of
foreign exchange and dealing in the foreign exchange is permitted only
through authorised person . . . The conservation and augmentation of
foreign exchange continues to be as important as it was under FERA. The
restrictions on the dealings in foreign exchange continue to be as rigorous
in FEMA as they were in FERA and the control of the Government over
foreign exchange continues to be as complete and full as it was in FERA.
Dropti Devi v. Union of India, (2012) 7 SCC 499, 529 (India). In Vijay Karia, the
Supreme Court did not disagree with these observations but contextualised them
by stating that they were made “in the context of preventive detention of persons
who violate foreign exchange regulations.” The court held that
to contend that any violation of any FEMA Rule would make such
violation an illegal activity does not follow. In fact, even if the reasoning
contained in this judgment [Dropti Devi] is torn out of its specific context
and applied to this case [Vijay Karia], there being no alleged smuggling
activity which involves depletion of foreign exchange, as against foreign
exchange coming into the country as a result of sale of shares in an Indian
company to a foreign company, it does not follow that such violation, even
if proved, would breach the fundamental policy of Indian law.
Id.
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RBI.188 If a transfer of securities (for instance, through a put option)
results in a breach of any FEMA regulations, the RBI has the power
to condone this breach.189 Thus, impermissible transactions under
FEMA are not inherently violative of its provisions as they can all be
potentially permitted by the RBI after they have been carried out.190
Based on this change in India’s foreign exchange regime (from FERA
to FEMA), the Supreme Court held that a violation of FEMA can
never be a ground to refuse the enforcement of a foreign arbitral
award.191
The Vijay Karia decision has laid to rest the question of the role
of India’s foreign exchange laws vis-à-vis the public policy
exception. There will always be some amount of uncertainty when
it comes to the judiciary’s approach, and the NAFED case is evidence
of this as it was rendered amidst a pro-enforcement ethos in the
Supreme Court and High Courts. Whether the NAFED decision will
be an anomaly or used as grounds to challenge Vijay Karia’s
approach cannot be conclusively determined at this stage.
However, the Vijay Karia decision in addition to the 2015
amendment are likely to maintain the pro-enforcement approach in
courts for the future. Part V provides a detailed analysis of the
Docomo case and uses this as a template to explain the High Courts’
approach to put options in the context of foreign arbitral awards.
These High Court decisions are also used to explain the limitations
faced by investors despite the current pro-enforcement approach
taken by the judiciary and establish the urgent need to rationalize
India’s regulations on put options at the policy level.
V. HIGH COURT DECISIONS: A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION
a. The Docomo Case
The Delhi High Court decision in NTT Docomo, Inc. v. Tata Sons
Ltd. 192 is particularly significant because it made a conclusive
188

(India).
189
190
191
192

See Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi, (2020) SCC Online SC 177, 18
See id.
See id. at 88.
See id. at 90.
See NTT Docomo, Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd., (2017) SCC Online Del 8078 (India).
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pronouncement about RBI’s role in the enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards. The Docomo case dealt with the enforceability of a
foreign arbitral award made by the London Court of International
Arbitration (LCIA).193 NTT Docomo Inc, a company incorporated in
Japan (Docomo), and Tata Sons, Ltd. (Tata) and Tata Teleservices
Limited (TTSL), each incorporated in India, had entered into a
Shareholders Agreement (SHA) in 2009.194 The SHA outlined the
terms of Docomo’s investment in TTSL’s business through the
purchase of its shares. One of the clauses in the SHA (the sale option
clause) provided Docomo with an exit option in case TTSL did not
meet certain performance indicators prescribed in the SHA.195 The
sale option clause was, at the minimum, in the nature of a stop-loss
provision which permitted Docomo an exit while limiting the extent
of its losses. As described in more detail below, the exit option
clause provided that Tata would be required to find a buyer for
Docomo’s shares at a price equivalent to the fair value of the shares
on July 7, 2014, or fifty percent of the price at which Docomo
purchased TTSL’s shares (the sale price), whichever was higher. If
Tata could not find a buyer willing to purchase Docomo’s shares at
the sale price, the clause required Tata to purchase the shares or
procure their purchase at any price and indemnify Docomo for the
shortfall. This clause essentially performed the functions of a put
option for downside protection but was structured to provide Tata
with at least with one alternative means to perform its obligations in
a manner (by finding a non-resident buyer for the Docomo shares)
in which the restrictions imposed by the RBI’s pricing guidelines
would not apply.196
Due to market factors, TTSL was not able to meet the SHA’s
performance indicators. Consequently, Docomo invoked its right
under the sale option clause through a trigger notice on May 30,
2014, and requested Tata to find a buyer for its shares in TTSL.197 At
193
See NTT Docomo, Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd., LCIA Case No. 152896, Final
Award (June 22, 2016).
194
See NTT Docomo, Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd., (2017) SCC Online Del 8078, 2
(India).
195
See id.
196
See NTT Docomo, Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd., LCIA Case No. 152896, Final
Award (June 22, 2016), ¶ 36; see also NTT Docomo, Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd., (2017) SCC
Online Del 8078, 10-11. The LCIA found that the put option clause was drafted in
the way that it was because “the Parties knew that exchange control regulations
and other considerations might prevent performance under a simple put.”
197
See NTT Docomo, Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd., (2017) SCC Online Del 8078, 2-3
(India).
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that time, the Tata-determined fair value of Docomo’s shares in
TTSL was INR 23.34 per share which was substantially lower than
the sale price of INR 58.045 per share.198 Upon receiving Docomo’s
trigger notice, Tata attempted to find a buyer for Docomo’s shares
but without success. Tata then approached the RBI seeking special
permission to remit the price of TTSL’s shares to Docomo per the
sale option clause, i.e., fifty percent of the price Docomo had paid
when it had initially purchased them. The RBI ultimately denied
Tata permission to purchase Docomo’s shares at the sale price. 199
Unable to reach a resolution through negotiations with Tata,
Docomo commenced arbitration proceedings before the LCIA on
January 3, 2015.200
In the case before the LCIA, Docomo claimed damages from Tata
in lieu of its performance of its obligations under the sale option
clause. Tata argued that the sale option clause was a “waterfall”
clause involving different stages of sequential performance.201 This
meant that Tata’s obligation was a qualified one and would be
considered as fulfilled once Tata had attempted to fulfill it using the
alternative means provided under the SHA. The sale option clause
contemplated that Tata would first attempt to find a buyer for
Docomo’s shares at the sale price. If no such buyer was found, then
Tata could acquire or procure the acquisition of Docomo’s share at
any price and indemnify Docomo for the remaining amount.202 Tata
argued that it had tried to find non-resident buyers and then
approached the RBI for permission to purchase the shares itself.203

198
See id. at 31; see also NTT Docomo, Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd., LCIA Case No.
152896, Final Award (June 22, 2016), at ¶ 50; see also Anandita Singh Mankotia &
Deepshika Sikarwar, RBI eases fair value buyout norm, allows Tatas to pay DoCoMo
previously agreed price for Tata Tele stake, ECON. TIMES (last updated Jan. 14, 2015, 08:19
AM IST), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/rbieases-fair-value-buyout-norm-allows-tatas-to-pay-docomo-previously-agreedprice-for-tata-tele-stake/articleshow/45879202.cms?from=mdr
[https://perma.cc/9VHK-TUCW].
199
See NTT Docomo, Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd., 2017 SCC Online Del 8078, 10
(India).
200
See id. at 3.
201
See NTT Docomo, Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd., LCIA Case No. 152896, Final
Award (June 22, 2016), ¶ 89(1) (India).
202
See id.
203
See id. ¶ 89(5). Tata argued that if FEMA required special permission for
Tata to purchase Docomo’s shares at the sale price then it meant that the sale option
clause was subject to a condition that RBI granted that permission.
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These attempts meant that Tata had fulfilled its obligations towards
Docomo.204
The LCIA was unpersuaded by this reasoning and found in a
unanimous decision that the sale option clause contained an
unqualified and absolute obligation on Tata’s part to secure
Docomo’s exit at the sale price.205 The LCIA held that the sale option
clause was neither illegal under FEMA nor did it require RBI
permission to be obtained. Tata was free to find a non-resident
buyer for Docomo’s shares and no RBI approval was required under
FEMA for the transfer of shares in an Indian company from a nonresident to another non-resident. However, no non-resident was
willing to purchase Docomo’s shares in TTSL at the sale price given
that their fair market value was well below such price. Furthermore,
no non-resident was willing to purchase the shares at any price.
Accordingly, the impediment Tata faced in fulfilling its obligations
under the exit option clause, the LCIA held, was a factual one
(inability to find a non-resident buyer) and not a legal one.206 The
need for RBI permission to enable Tata itself to purchase the shares
from Docomo and its denial were consequences of this factual
impossibility and did not affect the validity of the sale option clause
or the nature of Tata’s unqualified obligation towards Docomo
under it to find a buyer willing to purchase the shares. 207
Accordingly, Tata was obligated to indemnify Docomo for the full
amount of the obligation as provided in the contract (of course, if a
willing buyer had been found at an amount below the floor price,
Tata’s indemnification obligation would have been limited to the
shortfall). The LCIA disagreed with Tata’s “waterfall” analogy and
agreed with Docomo’s interpretation of the SHA and held that
Tata’s inability to fulfill its obligation through the alternative routes
described would not discharge Tata of these obligations

204
See id. ¶ 89. In support of its “waterfall” analogy, Tata had also relied upon
a clause in the SHA which provided that no party would take any action or have
any right that would violate applicable law. The parties were then required to
negotiate in good faith an alternative structure which would give to Docomo the
substantial benefits intended by the sale option clause. However, the parties could
not agree upon such an alternative structure. Since Tata claimed it had attempted
to perform at each stage of the sequential performance with reasonable diligence, it
argued that it was discharged by law; therefore, there was no breach.
205
See id. ¶ 121.
206
See id. ¶ 139-40.
207
See id.
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altogether.208 Once it was held that Tata’s primary obligation (the
obligation to find a buyer) was an unqualified one, the LCIA found
that the question whether a contractual obligation remains
enforceable if it is subject to a requirement for special permission
under the FEMA Regulations does not arise. Nor was it necessary
for the LCIA to decide whether special permission was required in
order for Tata to make payment under the indemnity in the sale
option clause, or the effect in law of RBI’s refusal of special
permission.209 Based on this reasoning, the LCIA awarded damages
to Docomo equivalent to the sale price under the exit option clause
together with interest. Docomo and Tata eventually entered into
consent terms based on the award.210
When Docomo approached the Delhi High Court to enforce the
LCIA award the RBI filed an application to intervene in the case
before the court. The RBI disagreed with the LCIA’s reasoning and
filed an application to be impleaded in the enforcement proceedings
before the Delhi High Court. Given that Tata had already agreed to
comply with the award and had agreed on consent terms, the main
opposition to the award’s enforcement came from the RBI.211 It was
argued that the award overlooked FEMA regulations and that
because of this, its enforcement would be against the public policy
of India.212 The High Court rejected the RBI’s argument and found
208
See id. ¶ 120-21. The LCIA held that Tata’s primary obligation—to find a
buyer for Docomo’s shares at the sale price—was absolute. Tata might have been
able to avoid a breach of its primary obligation by availing itself of one of the
alternative methods of performance provided for in the second part of the sale
option clause; but if Tata was not able to do so, it remained in breach and was liable
to pay damages to Docomo. See also NTT Docomo, Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd., (2017)
SCC Online Del 8078, 11 (India).
209
See NTT Docomo, Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd., LCIA Case No. 152896, Final
Award (June 22, 2016), at ¶ 140 (India).
210
See NTT Docomo, Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd., (2017) SCC Online Del 8078, 1721 (India). Tata had initially contested enforcement of the LCIA Award but
subsequently agreed to withdraw its objections to enforcement and pay to Docomo
the entire amount due under the award, subject to the Delhi High Court ruling on
the objections raised by the RBI in its intervention application.
211
Tata did not contest the validity per se of the put option or the agreement
on the price that was payable to Docomo under the put option; Tata claimed that
its obligations were subject to the RBI’s approval. In the enforcement proceedings
before the Delhi High Court after the RBI had intervened, Tata consented to pay the
amount under the award if the court rejected the objections raised by the RBI, which
the court ultimately did. For Tata, its reputation and record of adherence to
contractual commitment was also important, NTT Docomo, Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd.,
(2017) SCC Online Del 8078 at 62-64 (India). See id. at 21-25.
212
Id. at 22.
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that the award had adequately dealt with the legality of the SHA in
the context of FEMA regulations and that the arbitral tribunal’s
decision would be binding, even on the RBI. The case did not
require the court to go as far as to explain why the public policy
exception cannot be invoked solely on the basis of any illegality.
This is because the LCIA had found, and the court agreed, that the
structure of the transaction and the design of Docomo’s exit rights
did not contravene the RBI’s regulations per se simply because they
guaranteed to Docomo a minimum assured exit price. The court
held that the SHA between Tata and Docomo “could not be said to
be void or opposed to any Indian law including the FEMA”.213 The
court noted, “FEMA contains no absolute prohibition on contractual
obligations. It envisages grant of special permission by RBI” and
agreed with the LCIA that “Clause 5.7.2 of the SHA always was
legally capable of performance without the special permission of
RBI, using the general permission under sub-regulation 9(2) of
FEMA 20,” which permitted a transfer of shares from one nonresident to another non-resident at any price. 214 The court was
referring to the reasoning given in the LCIA Award that the put
option was structured keeping in mind implications under the
FEMA, and that Tata was under an unqualified obligation to
perform. The LCIA Award held that performance did not
necessarily require special permission from the RBI because certain
methods of performance (e.g., Tata finding a non-resident buyer for
Docomo shares) were already covered by general permissions.
Further, the RBI’s case that its permission was required for Tata
to transfer any money to Docomo was not cognizant of the fact that
the award did not enforce the put option per se, rather, it awarded
damages to Docomo payable by Tata. Accordingly, the question of
seeking the RBI’s permission did not arise as no such permission is
required for the payment of damages.215 The court also ruled that
[A]s long as the Award stands, there is no need for any
special permission of RBI for remission by Tata of the
amount awarded thereunder to Docomo as damages. The
refusal by RBI of such permission which is not required in
the first place, or the fact that such refusal has not been
Id. at 36.
Id.
215
Id. at 33 (noting that the RBI had “not placed before the Court any
requirement for any permission of RBI having to be obtained for Docomo to receive
the money as damages in terms of the Award”).
213
214
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challenged, would therefore not affect the enforceability of
the Award.216
Through this reasoning, the court addressed the RBI’s objection
to enforcement based on public policy which was premised on the
alleged illegality of the SHA and the need for the RBI’s permission
for Tata to transfer the award amount to Docomo. Thus, the award
of damages by the LCIA was the necessary element for true
enforcement of Docomo’s contractual rights.
However, this
required a litigated outcome. The Delhi High Court also noted that
the present case had an effect on the goodwill and reputation of
Indian entities that entered into contracts with foreign entities. 217
Seeing as the present contract was not entered into under any
duress, it was in the interest of public policy that the contracting
parties be allowed to honor it by the judiciary.218
The Delhi High Court took a strict approach to the RBI’s locus
standi or basis to intervene in the case. Section 48 of the Arbitration
Act does not allow third parties to implead themselves when the
enforcement of an award is being challenged.219 On the contrary, it
specifies that only a party in the award which is aggrieved by it has
the right to challenge the award based on the grounds provided in
216
Id. The LCIA had not expressed any view on the question whether or not
special permission of the RBI is required before Tata can perform its obligation to
pay Docomo damages in satisfaction of the Award. See LCIA Award, supra note
193, at 171. Tata had sought special permission of the RBI to make payment under
the Award but the same was rejected. The Delhi High Court held that no special
approval of the RBI was required in this case.
217
NTT Docomo, Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd., (2017) SCC Online Del 8078, 38 (India).
218
Id.
219
Id. at 25. It is important to note here that in the Docomo case, the court was
not examining whether the RBI should have granted special permission when Tata
first sought it prior to the commencement of arbitration proceedings. The court’s
examination was in the context of objections raised by the RBI in enforcement
proceedings under the Arbitration Act. In this sense, the court’s judgment in the
Docomo case is not a precedent for enforcement of fixed price put options per se and
it is unlikely that courts will rule on this issue, for it’s a matter of regulatory policy
on which courts would defer to RBI’s discretion instead of directing it to grant
approvals. Courts’ deference to RBI on policy matters is reflected in the Indian
Supreme Court’s observations in an earlier case that once the RBI has taken a view
it is not “open to the company or any other authority or individual to take upon
itself or himself, thereafter, the task of deciding whether the permission was rightly
granted by the Reserve Bank of India.” Life Ins.e Corp. of India v. Exps. Ltd., AIR
1986 SC 1370, 12 (India). In the Docomo case and other cases discussed in this
Article, the courts have examined the issue on a narrow basis—whether
enforcement of foreign awards for payment of damages, for example, could be
refused by the Indian courts or objected to by the RBI.
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section 48.220 The RBI was not a party to the award and consequently
could not use the Arbitration Act as the basis to implead itself. The
RBI turned to India’s Civil Procedure Code of 1908 (hereinafter
“CPC”) which gives courts the discretion to not enforce any
compromise that furthers an unlawful objective; 221 the RBI was
referring to the consent terms between Tata and Docomo which it
considered unlawful. Notwithstanding the High Court’s decision
that the award and consent terms were lawful , it also held that even
the CPC did not contemplate the intervention of a third party in such
cases. 222 The CPC only gave courts the discretion not to enforce
unlawful compromises but did not empower third parties to
intervene in these cases.223 Importantly, it held that the RBI could
not use issues decided by the arbitral tribunal as the basis for its
intervention in the present case. For instance, the RBI claimed that
by virtue of the fact that the case involved money leaving India, the
RBI had an inherent right to implead itself. The High Court
responded to this argument by referring to the LCIA decision that
had already assessed the role of the RBI in the case. Though the RBI
was not a part of those proceedings, the High Court noted that it
was argued by Tata that the RBI’s permission was required for it to
comply with the exit option. The LCIA had held that there was no
need to obtain RBI permission based on the nature of the amount
awarded (in the form of damages).224 The High Court concluded
that the LCIA award would bind the RBI as if it were a
pronouncement of any civil court: “ . . . RBI will, just as any other
entity, be bound by an Award interpreting the scope of its powers
or any of its regulations subject to it being upheld by a Court when
challenged by a party to the Award.”225 This is an important finding
of the Delhi High Court as it deferred to the arbitral authority to not
only direct the parties in the dispute but to conclusively determine

220

(India).

NTT Docomo, Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd., (2017) SCC Online Del 8078, ¶ 36

221
Id. at 38. See The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Order XXIII § (5)(3) (India)
(stating that “[a]n agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the
Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within the
meaning of this rule.”).
222
NTT Docomo, Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd., (2017) SCC Online Del 8078, 26-27
(India).
223
Id. at 26.
224
Id. at 27.
225
Id.
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the applicability of their findings on statutory bodies such as the
RBI.
b. Treatment of Downside Protection on Par with Assured Returns
The Docomo case was the last of a series of similar decisions
rendered by the Delhi High Court in 2017. Shakti Nath v. Alpha
Tiger226 and Cruz City v. Unitech227 were cases which also concerned
the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards based on put option
clauses and were decided by the Delhi High Court just before the
Docomo case. An important difference between Cruz City and
Docomo is that in the former, the put option agreement was not
simply for the purpose of downside risk protection but guaranteed
an assured return to the investor. The put option stipulated that the
price at which the foreign investor’s shares are purchased must be
equivalent to their initial capital commitment and a fifteen percent
post-tax internal rate of return (IRR).228 This was a put option that
guaranteed an assured return. Another distinction between the two
cases is that in Cruz City, the LCIA award did not provide for the
payment of damages to the foreign investor (Cruz City). Rather it
directly enforced the put option requiring the respondent (Unitech,
an Indian corporation) to pay Cruz City the purchase price of its
shares against delivery.229 While the LCIA award for Cruz City is not
available, a decision of the Mauritius Supreme Court (before whom
the enforcement of the same award was sought but against another
party) confirms that the relief in the award was in the form of a
direction to purchase shares and not an award of damages. 230 In
Cruz City the Delhi High Court acknowledged that the agreement
sought to be enforced may be invalid under FEMA but this would
not be the basis to deny the enforcement of an arbitral award based

226

(India).

Shakti Nath v. Alpha Tiger Cyprus Inv., (2017) SCC Online Del. 6894

227
Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings v. Unitech Ltd., (2017) SCC Online Del
7810 (India).
228
Id. at 5. For further discussion, see Makkar & Jain, supra note 13, at 408-09.
229
Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings v. Unitech Ltd., (2017) SCC Online Del
7810, 4-5 (India).
230
Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings v. Unitech Ltd., (2014) SCJ 100, 12-13, 26
(India).
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on the agreement, given the narrow scope of section 48.231 The court
concluded by stating that Unitech may be proceeded against under
FEMA as a result of entering into the put option agreement with
Cruz City, but this cannot be the basis on which it can escape liability
under the same agreement. 232 This approach allows foreign
investors to use India’s pro-enforcement stance in the context of
international commercial arbitration to effectively maneuver
around regulatory uncertainty. However, this would be achieved at
the cost of the Indian party being made subject to regulatory action.
Courts in India have not allowed parties to do indirectly what they
cannot do directly. 233 This principle can be equally applied to
transactions that are structured around the FEMA regulations.
While the scope of judicial review is limited in the context of
enforcing the arbitral award, the same restraint need not be
exercised when taking action against the Indian party for any
regulatory violation. Thus, the lack of a more nuanced policy on put
options not only affects foreign investors but also increases the risk
faced by Indian parties when they enter into agreements that are
structured around foreign exchange regulations.
This distinction is important to understand the full scope of an
arbitral tribunal’s powers to make awards based on put options. In
the Docomo case the Delhi High Court did not find the award or its
enforcement in contravention of public policy, and added that
factors such as impact on the foreign direct investment inflows and
strategic relations between the countries where parties are located
will have to be kept in mind while examining whether enforcement
of an award would be consistent with the public policy of India.234
However, the actual enforcement of the LICA award in Docomo did
not require any FEMA regulations to be violated as the award
characterized Tata’s obligation to pay Docomo as damages and not
as consideration for the transfer of securities.235 By contrast, in Cruz
City, the High Court was dealing with an award which would be
impermissible under FEMA but nevertheless decided to enforce the

231
Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings v. Unitech Ltd., (2017) SCC Online Del
7810, 42 (India).
232
Id. at 70-71.
233
See Singh v. Singh, (1979) 2 SCR 282, ¶ 5 (India) (explaining that to permit
a party to do indirectly what a statute forbids them from doing directly would be
tantamount to permitting parties to evade the statute).
234
NTT Docomo, Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd., 2017 SCC Online Del 8078, 30 (India).
235
Id. at 32-33.
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award.236 In Shakti Nath the Delhi High Court dealt with a domestic
arbitral award and an application to set it aside under section 34 of
the Arbitration Act. In this case, the SHA gave the foreign investor
the option to either trigger the put option or claim damages under
the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The investor had chosen the former
and the arbitral award provided the relief of damages. 237 The
arbitral award was challenged for giving effect to a put option by
disguising its exercise as a claim for damages. The High Court
dismissed this challenge and held that in the event of a breach, the
contract allowed the investor to exercise the put option or claim
damages. Given that the claim and arbitral award were for
damages, the question of RBI approval or their prohibition of put
options would not arise in the first place. This decision was upheld
by the Supreme Court 238 and is encouraging for investors as it
represents a pro-enforcement stance even for domestic-seated
arbitration.239
VI. GAPS IN THE CURRENT APPROACH
High Court decisions have made it clear that the judiciary will
not intervene in the enforcement of arbitral awards even if they
contravene provisions of FEMA. While this is a step in the right
direction, the lack of regulatory certainty has created hurdles for
foreign investors who have legitimate business interests in
managing their investment risks through freely negotiated exit
rights. Relying on judicial enforcement increases the time taken to
exercise put options and imposes additional financial strain on the
party that loses the case before the arbitral tribunal. Even after
parties successfully enforce a foreign arbitral award, the freedom
with which they can use the proceeds of the award could be
constrained. For example, in some cases exit options are structured
236
Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings v. Unitech Ltd., (2017) SCC Online Del
7810, 52, 55-56 (India).
237
Shakti Nath v. Alpha Tiger, (2017) SCC Online Del., 6894, ¶¶ 52-53, 58-63
(India).
238
Id. ¶ 63.
239
Claim for Damages for Breach of Contract under Section 73 of the Contract Act,
1872 by a non-resident does not violate the RBI guidelines, AZB & PARTNERS: ADVOCS. &
SOLICS. (Apr. 1, 2017), https://www.azbpartners.com/bank/claim-of-damagesfor-breach-of-contract-under-section-73-of-the-contract-act-1872-by-a-nonresident-does-not-violate-the-rbi-guidelines/ [https://perma.cc/5E6T-J2F9].
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to address FEMA regulations by retaining a portion of award
proceeds in India. The following discussion explains these
implications in detail.
a. Forcing Parties into Arbitration Proceedings
In the context of put options exercisable by foreign investors, the
uncertainties created by the regulatory regime place Indian
residents in a position that drive foreign investors to arbitration not
only as a dispute resolution mechanism but as a necessary means to
enforce their contractual rights. The severe penal consequences that
follow under FEMA for any violation 240 prevents an Indian party
from honoring non-market value-based put options irrespective of
whether or not it is willing to do so. Litigation then is the safest and
perhaps the only means to a resolution. However, an award for
damages for breach of contract brings with it reputational issues
which, as the Docomo case has shown, is not a desirable outcome for
Indian parties who are ready and willing to honor their contractual
commitments. This is because the RBI thus far has not granted
permission to transfer securities to a non-resident for consideration
that is noncompliant with the prescribed pricing guidelines. In the
Docomo case, a two-step process was followed by the RBI. The RBI
first carried out its own evaluation, which was in favor of granting
an exception, and then made a recommendation to the Ministry of
Finance, Government of India, which, having the power to take the
final call on the request, denied the recommendation.
Based on correspondence cited in the Docomo case, it appears
that the RBI is cognizant of the difference between put options
designed to secure assured returns (as in Cruz City) and those
designed to reduce downside risk (as in Docomo). When considering
Tata’s request to buy Docomo’s shares at the sale price, RBI officials
240
Section 13 of FEMA prescribes the penalties for violations of the Act and
contravention of any rule, regulation, notification, direction or order made
thereunder. The amount of the fine could be up to three times the sum involved in
the violation where such amount is quantifiable, or up to two lakh Indian Rupees
where the amount is not quantifiable, and a further penalty that may extend up to
five thousand Indian Rupees for every day after the first day during which the
contravention continues. Under Section 42 of FEMA, directors and other persons
in management of a company in contravention of FEMA will be personally liable
for the consequences of such violations. Additionally, the provisions of Section
37(1) of FEMA stipulate that the Directorate of Enforcement shall investigate any
person/entity for the alleged contraventions referred to in Section 13 of FEMA.
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had stated that the exit option clause did not guarantee an assured
return. 241 Assured returns are characterized by the investor
recovering its entire investment plus a certain return on that
investment. Under the sale option clause, the investor was only
recovering fifty percent of its own investment; the clause was thus
intended to provide downside protection and a fair arrangement.242
The RBI was cognizant that a bare reading of FEMA regulations
would come in the way of enforcing this exit option; however, it also
noted the importance of India’s strategic relationship with Japan
with respect to foreign direct investment inflows.243 In conclusion,
the RBI had initially found that the request to honor the exit option
had merit and that it should be granted in this case and future cases
having similar circumstances.244 When the request was referred to
the Ministry of Finance, Government of India, it stated that an
exception could not be made for one case.245 The Ministry of Finance
stated that the present FEMA regulations had to be applied to the
case. It also suggested that if the RBI believed some deviation from
the present regulations were warranted then it should present a

241

(India).

See NTT Docomo, Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd., (2017) SCC Online Del 8078, 29-31

242
See id. at 29-31, 35-36 (explaining the RBI’s internal correspondence claimed
that the “intention” behind the regulation was to disallow exit with assured return,
which was not the case in Docomo).
243
See id. at 31 (explaining that the RBI stated that

[h]owever, the larger issue here is of a fair commitment in the contracts in
relation to an investment and a downside protection of an investment,
rather than an assured return. Besides our strategic relationship with
Japan in recent times in relation to FDI flows is also a matter to be kept in
view.
In the Letter of Reserve Bank of India to Department of Economic Affairs,
Investment Division, Ministry of Finance, dated December 22, 2014 [hereinafter RBI
Letter]); see also NTT Docomo, Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd., LCIA Case No. 152896, Final
Award, ¶ 68 (June 22, 2016).
244
See NTT Docomo, Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd., (2017) SCC Online Del 8078, 31
(India) (“In view of this, we are inclined to accept the proposal and in future, in all
such case, similar principle shall be applied.”); see also Vijay Sambamurthi, Recent
Developments in Indian Law: Impact on Private Equity Transactions, 28 NAT’L L. SCH.
INDIA REV. 44, 49 (2016).
245
See NTT Docomo, Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd., (2017) SCC Online Del 8078, 31
(India) (sharing that the Ministry of Finance stated that “[t]he proposal needs to be
examined by RBI per its extant regulations. An individual proposal cannot be
considered in exception of such regulations.”); see also NTT Docomo, Inc. v. Tata
Sons Ltd., LCIA Case No. 152896, Final Award, ¶ 69 (June 22, 2016).
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proposal for their change to the Ministry for its consideration.246 It
was consequent to this communication by the Ministry of Finance
that the RBI finally refused Tata’s request to transfer money to
Docomo for its shares for the predetermined price under the SHA.
Though the present foreign exchange regime is a permissive one
as held by the Supreme Court in Vijay Karia, permission for
transactions are granted based on the discretion of the RBI and the
Ministry of Finance. The preceding cases have shown that the norm
is not to permit such transactions even though their fairness has
been acknowledged by the RBI.247 This makes the exercise of put
options without an arbitral award subject to regulatory hurdles
unless the put option complies with FEMA Regulations. As seen
from Docomo and Cruz City, put options exist to mitigate an
investor’s losses or secure assured returns; investors thus have an
incentive to exercise put options only when the sale price cannot be
obtained through the sale of shares at their fair market value. The
effect of the pricing guidelines under the erstwhile regulations
(FEMA 20) framed by the RBI was that put options could operate
exclusively in situations where they are least likely to be used by
investors. The RBI’s policy, and now the Central Government’s
Non-Debt Rules, 2019 that continue that policy, have created an
avoidable clog in the wheels of international business requiring
parties, even when there may be no genuine dispute, to arbitrate,
obtain an award, and have their rights enforced through the
judiciary (the High Courts and Supreme Court). Foreign investors
may still be willing to invest in India and structure transactions to
try to address the restrictions. However, from the Supreme Court’s
decision in Cruz City, it would appear that the party in India will
continue to remain subject to regulatory action.248 Relying on the
judiciary is thus not an optimal solution as it increases the cost of
enforcing a simple contractual right. Some of the ways in which this
happens are explained below.249
246
See NTT Docomo, Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd., (2017) SCC Online Del 8078, 31
(India) (“In case, RBI is of the opinion that the existing regulations need
modification, a detailed proposal on the subject along with justification and
rationale may be forwarded in the Government for taking a view in the matter.”).
247
See id.
248
See Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings v. Unitech Ltd., (2017) SCC Online Del
7810, ¶¶ 100-03 (India).
249
See HSA Advocates, India: RBI On Downside Protection—Are We Set for
Course
Correction?,
MONDAQ
(June
1,
2017),
https://www.mondaq.com/india/shareholders/598944/rbi-on-downside-
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b. Costs of Enforcing Put Options Through Arbitration
The first cause of increased costs arises from the uncertainty
created by enforcing a contractual right through arbitration.
Though arbitral tribunals have been allowing foreign investors to
benefit from put options either directly or through the award of
damages, parties should not have to subject themselves to this
process in the first place. The second issue is that arbitration is a
costly process. The process of completing the arbitration and
subsequent enforcement in the Docomo case was expensive. The
award of costs in the arbitration alone, as cited in the arbitral
decision, constituted approximately GBP 120,000 in arbitration costs
and over JPY 1,000,000,000 by way of legal costs.250 It is pertinent to
note that the aforesaid figures do not include other costs which were
incurred by Tata.
The often-cited advantages of arbitration include its ability to
provide speedy dispute resolution, with confidentiality and at low
cost. As seen in the Docomo case, none of these tenets are true in
large commercial arbitrations. When one adds the costs of prearbitration negotiation and preparation (including extensive and
voluminous document requests and review) and post-award
enforcement action, the time and costs involved can significantly
exceed the award of costs (award of costs usually only cover costs
from the time after filing through award; post-award interest covers
the period after award to payment—the costs of enforcement
litigation are not included). Put options are meant to be a tool to
manage the risks of, and thereby attract, foreign investment by
providing for reasonable exit terms. If the cost of their enforcement
is too high, their use will be restricted only to larger corporations
which will be able incur such expenses.

protection-are-we-set-for-course-correction [https://perma.cc/5QZU-Y6ED]; see
also Radhika Pandey & Bhargavi Zaveri-Shah, Policy Implications Of The Tata-Docomo
Order,
BLOOMBERG
QUINT
(May
9,
2017,
12:20
PM
IST),
https://www.bloombergquint.com/opinion/policy-implications-of-the-tatadocomo-order [https://perma.cc/9VNS-UJ7A]; Makkar & Jain, supra note 13, at
407-08, 413.
250
See NTT Docomo, Inc. v. Tata Sons Ltd., (2017) SCC Online Del 8078, 15
(India). The awarded costs did not include pre-arbitration preparation and
negotiation costs. In addition, enforcement actions were commenced in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York and the London
Commercial Court in addition to the Delhi High Court, and were stayed pending
the case before the Delhi High Court.
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In the same vein, companies may have to pay increased damages
in the form of interest due to delayed regulatory approval or simply
due to the length of the proceedings involved to secure an arbitral
award and then enforce it in India. During the LCIA proceedings,
Tata requested that the LCIA refrain from providing for the
payment of post award interest. This was on account of the fact that
Tata’s ability to pay the awarded damages was contingent on
approval from the RBI. The LCIA rejected this contention and only
allowed a twenty-one-day grace period, after which Tata was
required to pay interest on the damages. Not all corporations may
be able to incur such costs, and regardless of the Indian entity’s
relative ability to bear such costs, it is certainly not a desirable
situation if the dispute could be avoided in the first place.
The third issue relates to the characterization of the relief in the
award as damages, and the reputational implications for the losing
party. A breach of contract and consequent damages carries
negative associations. The implication is that a party was either
unwilling or unable to honor a contract. When it comes to the
current tenuous route to enforce put options, this is not necessarily
the case. In Docomo, it was the RBI’s refusal to grant permission that
created the ultimate basis for Docomo to argue non-performance of
an obligation by Tata. While context will help dispel any adverse
implications one may draw from an award of damages, there is
always an underlying and unnecessary risk posed to a nonperforming party’s reputation. Finally, even if the RBI and Ministry
of Finance were to approve requests to honor put options on a caseby-case basis, the very fact that such approvals are discretionary will
result in uncertainty. One may legitimately ask whether Tata’s
request to purchase Docomo’s shares merited the grant of any
special permission, especially when the norm was to strictly apply
the RBI policy against put options. In the absence of clear and
deliberate guidelines upon which such discretion would be
exercised, it is difficult to convince investors that it will be exercised
without any arbitrariness.
c. Remittance—the Last Yard of Enforcement
A review of the High Court decisions conveys the limitations of
their pro-enforcement stance. High Courts have consistently and
unequivocally held that awards based on put option clauses ought
to be enforced. However, the enforcement of an award does not
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automatically guarantee the right to remit the award amount. In
Cruz City, the Delhi High Court enforced the arbitral award but held
that any money recovered from Unitech (the Indian resident) could
be remitted only after following FEMA Regulations and the pricing
guidelines. In a recent case decided by the Bombay High Court,
Banyan Tree v. Axiom Cordages,251 a pronouncement to this effect was
made. In Banyan Tree, the put option guaranteed the foreign investor
an assured return of fifteen percent when exercised (target value).
The Bombay High Court allowed the enforcement of the foreign
arbitral award providing for the performance of the put option
clause, citing precedent such as Vijay Karia and Cruz City in its
judgment. However, it noted that the put option was legal because
it stipulated that only the fair market value of the shares will be
remitted through foreign exchange (not requiring special
permission of the RBI) and the difference between the fair market
value and target value will be deposited in Indian Rupees to a
nominee account in India as appointed by the foreign investor.252 In
Docomo, the requirement of RBI permission did not arise ultimately
because RBI’s intervention and objections were rejected and the
award’s relief was in the form of damages, payment of which, as the
court held, was not prevented under any express provision of FEMA
or FEMA Regulations.253 Thus, the parties’ ability to fully realize the
relief granted to them depends on how it is characterized. The
present policy also reduces investor freedom. To the extent that
parties are required to leave proceeds in India for the purpose of
complying with FEMA Regulations, it constrains the investor’s
freedom to use the proceeds as it sees fit. For instance, all the
investment in the Banyan Tree case was made in U.S. Dollars, but the
proceeds were recovered in Indian Rupees (amounts constituting
interest payments were retained in India to meet RBI pricing
requirements) and U.S. Dollars (to the extent of the amounts that
were remitted outside of India). Investor freedom is also curtailed
when the attempt to work within FEMA Regulations results in
remittance of put option proceeds to a nominated account in India
for use within the country. These limitations on the use of proceeds
from put options effectively reduce their value and consequently
their ability to attract foreign investments in India.
251
See Banyan Tree Growth Cap. L.L.C. v. Axiom Cordages Ltd., (2020) SCC
Online Bom 781 (India).
252
See id. ¶ 91; see also Kazi & Agarwal, supra note 44.
253
See supra Part V(A).
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The correspondence between the RBI and the Ministry of
Finance regarding the Docomo case took place in 2014-2015 but no
changes were subsequently made to FEMA 20. Rather, they have
been incorporated by the Central Government in the Non-Debt
Rules of 2019 that replaced FEMA 20. The recent Supreme Court
pronouncement in Vijay Karia and cases such as Banyan Tree have
renewed discussions on India’s policy towards put options. By
removing the blanket ban on put options the Central Government
and the RBI may be able to better regulate them. In the status quo,
put options designed for assured returns and downside protection
are being treated in the same manner. Since the enforcement of these
put options will happen through the same route, corporations will
not be deterred from entering into put options providing assured
returns. By recognizing (and permitting) downside protection in
foreign investment, the Central Government and the RBI can
differentiate it from assured returns and regulate the two practices
differently. For instance, proceeds of assured returns could be taxed
at a higher rate than downside protection in order to disincentivize
the former.
Put options are extensively used in India because of a lack of
investor confidence, accordingly, they play a crucial role in
attracting investments in India.254 Downside protection offered by
put options allow investors to venture into unfamiliar markets with
more confidence because the extent of their losses will be capped.
At the same time, this Article acknowledges the RBI’s interest in
ensuring the stability of India’s monetary reserves and ensuring that
debt instruments are not disguised as equity. An investor ought to
assume some risk, and this is where the distinction between assured
returns and downside protection becomes significant. At present, it
is only the judiciary that seems to recognize the need for Indian
residents to uphold their contractual obligations to foreign
investors. However, when the judiciary enforces put options
through arbitral awards, it follows a policy of non-interference with
the award; meaning that different treatment of downside protection
and assured returns is not judicially imposable. Rather, the judiciary
asserts its doctrinal approach to the issue through holdings that
subject India’s regulators to the findings of the arbitral tribunals.
Further, despite the pro-enforcement trend in the context of
254
See Makkar & Jain, supra note 13, at 414; see also Shilpa Mankar Ahluwalia
& Kushagra Priyadarshani, Enforcing put options as a method of investor exit, INDIA
BUS. L.J. (June 24, 2012), https://law.asia/enforcing-put-options-as-a-method-ofinvestor-exit/[https://perma.cc/GV53-NPHT].
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commercial arbitration, the fact that investors need to look to
arbitration and the judiciary and not the other contracting party for
the enforcement of their rights in the first instance is not emblematic
of an investment-friendly environment. Parties’ desires for a neutral
venue under neutral rules is a key driver for their decision to initiate
arbitration. Thereafter, enforcement actions of favorable awards are
commenced through courts in India, thus relying on the judiciary to
enforce the award. Such courts’ willingness to narrowly construe
the public policy exception gives foreign investors comfort, but it
doesn’t obviate the need to first resort to arbitration and then go
through a lengthy enforcement process.
VII. CONCLUSION
There are clear limitations to the present regime governing the
enforcement of put options exercisable by foreign investors. The
current approach is heavily reliant on foreign arbitral awards and
their enforcement by courts. While courts have steadfastly enforced
these awards when required, parties should not have to rely on
litigation as a first resort to fulfill contractual obligations. Despite
the current pro-enforcement stance of Indian courts towards foreign
arbitral awards, the lack of a responsive regulatory framework poses
several challenges to foreign investment. These include high costs
of litigation and the inability to remit proceeds of put options
outside India, unless structured as an award of damages.
Irrespective of whether an investment is structured as providing for
an assured return or downside protection, in order to realize the full
amount and use it outside India, it would have to be characterized
as damages by the foreign arbitral award. In cases where the award
does not characterize the awarded amount as damages, the party
desiring to enforce the award would have to retain any amount
above fair market value in India. In order to increase investor
freedom and confidence, India will need to rationalize its policy
towards downside protection of foreign investment. The RBI
seemed to have been inclined to allow put options guaranteeing
downside protection. Given this inclination, the RBI should
persuade the Central Government to leverage the present judicial
momentum and frame a more nuanced regime governing
optionality clauses; one that distinguishes between assured returns
and downside protection.
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